Accommodating Employees with Disabilities During Litigation

, ,

By Deryn Sumner, July 19, 2017

When we think of accommodating employees with disabilities, we often think of it only in the context of what accommodations the employee needs to perform the essential functions of his or her job at work.  However, when employees with disabilities file EEO complaints, it often reasonably follows that these individuals need accommodations to participate in the litigation of their EEO complaints.  The EEOC’s Administrative Judge’s Handbook (available at https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/ajhandbook.cfm) notes that “[a] party, witness or representative appearing before the Commission may be entitled to a reasonable accommodation for a disability. The Administrative Judge may order the agency to provide the accommodation.”  But what recourse does a complainant have when he or she is not provided an accommodation during litigation of a case?

The EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations considered such a situation in Davina W. v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 0120162615 (January 18, 2017). There, the complainant worked as an attorney for SSA in Atlanta, Georgia and had previously settled a prior EEO complaint in 2009 that allowed her to work at an alternate duty station on certain days and have a flexible start time due to her disability.  This didn’t appear to improve the complainant’s work situation, as she subsequently filed two more EEO complaints.  After the agency completed an investigation and the case was before an administrative judge, the agency sought to depose complainant.

The complainant requested that as a reasonable accommodation for her disability, the deposition begin in the afternoon, that she be granted frequent breaks, and given the late start time and need for frequent breaks, noted that the deposition could be conducted over two days.  The complainant stated she needed these accommodations due to medication she took in the morning that took five hours to kick in and resulted in severe abdominal pain and retching and her need for frequent restroom breaks.  According to the decision, the agency declined to start the deposition at a later time or conduct it over two days, and alleged that that the complainant refused to cooperate with the agency’s attempts to depose her.

The complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the agency failed to provide her an accommodation or engage in the interactive process with her regarding her deposition, and the agency discriminated against her when an agency official suggested that she consider disability retirement if she required a reasonable accommodation for her deposition.

The Commission found that these allegations should not have been considered separate complaints, but they should have been addressed by the presiding administrative judge in her case, noting its concern that the administrative judge “did not address Complainant’s clear request for an accommodation during her deposition.”  The Commission noted that the administrative judge has a duty and obligation to accommodate parties and witnesses and remanded the complaint for a hearing.

I share the Commission’s concern that the administrative judge did not address the complainant’s clear request for accommodation.  The complainant was not seeking to be excused from deposition entirely, but rather to have the deposition start late enough in the day and provide enough restroom breaks to accommodate her medical condition, which appears reasonable and would have met the agency’s goal of obtaining the complainant’s deposition testimony.  Instead of being required to file a separate EEO complaint to address the issue, the administrative judge should have considered it as part of overseeing processing of her existing EEO complaints. [email protected]

 

Psychiatric Examinations, the MSPB, and the EEOC

, ,

By Barbara Haga, July 19, 2017

Last month I began recounting the case of Ms Doe, whose employer the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), was concerned about her “unusual and inappropriate behavior.”  We pick up the case with the documentation of the issues with Ms Doe’s behavior and the medical review of that information.  Some of the specifics below come from the subsequent EEOC decision issued earlier this year, Marya S. v. PBGC, EEOC Petition No. 0320160066 (2017).

Documentation

Between February and May 2009. the agency had evidence of multiple exchanges that depicted several instances of behavior that seemed to indicate that there was an issue with her mental status.  These were recorded in e-mails and statements from those who participated in them.  They included the following:

  • Ms Doe sent an e-mail to the Deputy IG claiming her home had been broken into several times since she released information to the IG office. Doe asked if any member of the Deputy IG’s staff had been in her home without her consent.
  • Ms Doe sent an e-mail to her supervisor accusing the supervisor of harassing her and alleging that the supervisor had called a transit officer the previous evening and provided him with the number of the train car in which Ms Doe was riding. She went on to say that “I pray that whatever stronghold has you captive will set you free.” She copied EEO, the CIO, the DCIO, and the OIG on this e-mail.  Ms Doe went on to say that according to the rumor mill the supervisor was trying to get rid of her.
  • In a meeting with her supervisor, Ms Doe accused the supervisor and another official of listening to her conversations and stated that she knew about the “ear piece”. Following the meeting, Ms Doe sent an e-mail to her supervisor in which she said that she hoped the supervisor had presented herself well in front of the hidden camera.

Medical Reviews

After the meeting with the supervisor in May 2009, the supervisor consulted with HR regarding the situation. HR forwarded the information to Federal Occupational Health (FOH) and an FOH physician completed a worksheet indicating he had spoken with HR regarding Ms Doe’s paranoid behavior and would recommend a fitness for duty examination (FFDE).  That physician had contact with Dr. Hibler, a psychologist, who would ultimately conduct the FFDE stating that the real issue was whether Ms Doe was a danger to herself or others.

On May 28, 2009 PBGC ordered Ms Doe to undergo a fitness for duty exam with Dr. Hibler, and placed her on administrative leave pending the results.  Dr. Hibler’s report of the examination stated that Ms Doe was experiencing a psychotic delusional disorder and was unfit.  He recommended that Ms Doe “not be considered for potential return to the workplace until a treating practitioner advises that she is stable and has the resources sufficient to perform her duties.”  He also suggested a follow-up FFDE at that time to objectively determine her emotional status and readiness to perform her duties.

Enforced Leave

Upon receipt of Dr. Hibler’s medical determination, PBGC utilized indefinite suspension procedures to put Ms Doe out of her own sick leave.  The action issued on June 29, 2009 stated that the condition which would end the enforced leave was that she submit documentation from her health care provider confirming that (1) her condition had stabilized, (2) she was no longer a danger to yourself or others in the workplace, and that (3) she was fit to return to work.

Ms Doe replied to the proposal asking for administrative leave for another two to three months so that she could locate a new primary care physician and make an appointment with a psychiatrist.  The agency declined to grant further administrative leave and put her on enforced leave in August 2009.

Medical Clearance to Return to Work

Ms Doe submitted a report in September 2009 from Dr. Schell (a psychiatrist) which stated she “… does not have a history of being a threat to others and is not a present danger to herself or others.  She is able to return [sic] to work without restriction.”  PBGC removed Ms Doe from enforced leave status and placed her on administrative leave pending Dr. Hilber’s review of Dr. Schell’s report.

Dr. Hilber’s letter dated September 14, 2009 regarding his review of the submitted documentation, stated, “Dr. Schell’s report does not contain details and an explanation that would be needed to sufficiently understand [the appellant’s] fitness for her return to work (whether with or without accommodation).”  Dr. Hilber recommended that Ms Doe be reevaluated by an independent medical examination sponsored by PBGC so that the perspectives offered by Dr. Schell are considered by an evaluator of the same professional discipline.

PBGC did as Dr. Hilber suggested and notified Ms Doe that she had two options:  1) to submit medical information that cured the deficiencies in the report Dr. Schell submitted or 2) submit to a follow-up examination with Dr. Hilber and a psychiatric evaluation with Dr. Allen.  Ms Doe chose the first option and submitted a progress note from Dr. Schell. Dr. Hilber reviewed the note and found that it did not address the deficiencies noted earlier.  On October 1, 2009 PBGC ordered Ms Doe to undergo the evaluation with Dr. Hilber on October 8, 2009 and an appointment with Dr. Allen on October 9, 2009.

Ms Doe attended the appointment with Dr. Hilber.  He found that she was still evidencing severe mental illness.  He went on to say that she was “too fragile to be safely returned to the workplace.”  Ms.Doe did not attend the appointment with Dr. Allen.

PBGC followed up with a notice to Ms Doe advising that she had two options, 1) to give consent for Dr. Hilber to consult directly with Dr. Schell to resolve the deficiencies in the medical report and evaluate her for return to work, or 2) undergo the psychiatric evaluation with Dr. Allen.  Ms Doe was given a deadline of November 6, 2009 to advise HR or her choice of option.  She was notified that if she did not elect one of the options and timely notify HR her status would be changed to AWOL.  Ms. Doe did not comply and her status was changed to AWOL beginning on November 9, 2009.

What Came Next?

Ms Doe filed two MSPB appeals, one on the enforced leave action and the second on her placement in AWOL status.  She later filed an appeal with the EEOC of the MSPB decision which found that there was no disability discrimination or retaliation in the PBGC’s actions.  We will review the decisions next time, and return to the issue of the problem with the OPM medical examination regulations.

Reality Check for the New Political Overlords

,

By William Wiley, July 11, 2017

We get so many good questions. This one comes from a class participant in our fabulous FELTG FLRA Law Week (next offered in Washington, DC November 13-17):

Dear FELTG Labor Law Semi-Experts (I say “semi” because as you teach, no human on Earth really understands federal labor law)-

I took your FLRA class last spring in Washington, D.C.  (It was very helpful, thanks!)  I’m pretty sure that at some point during the course, you offered that we could send you a question afterwards. I’d like to take you up on your kind offer.

My question is whether (or when?) a local CBA always “trumps” an Agency policy, or if that holding is limited to “localized” policies.  I’m looking at cases such as Broadcasting Board of Governors v. AFGE (66 FLRA 380), that seems to indicate this is well settled.  But, in an environment (such as we have here at my agency), where we have unions that have National Consultation Rights (NCR), I’m trying to reconcile these rulings with my basic understanding of the Union’s very limited rights in NCR, and that the Agency is permitted to make universal policies at a national level as long as they go through NCR (local CBAs be damned).

In other words – if, at a local field center, the local management agrees to terms on, say, office workspace, with their local union, enter into a CBA articulating those provisions, and then later on, the national agency management comes up with a national level policy on office workspace, that is inconsistent with the terms of the CBA, but properly goes through the NCR process.  Which policy controls at the local field center?  The national level Agency policy?  Or the local policy as articulated in the CBA?  It just doesn’t make sense to me that a local manager’s actions at the local level (in signing the CBA) could essentially prevent national management from having a universal policy.

Any thoughts on this?

And our FELTG response. Sad!

Dear FLRA Law Week participant-

Very nice to hear from you. As for your question, the union agreement always trumps an agency’s new policies – even when there are national consultation rights – with only two exceptions:

  1. The agency can demonstrate that the new policy is related to the “necessary functioning” of the agency and the change is in response to an “overriding exigency.” See SEC v. FLRA, 568 F.3d 990 (D.C. Cir., 2009).
  2. The new policy is implementing a new law (the incontrovertible law part of the new policy is effective right away; the agency still must bargain I & I and any flexible parts of the law).

As for your hypothetical, as much as it makes our eyes burn, if local management agrees to office space of a specific size, and the agency head later decrees that office space will be less than that, the agency is obligated to continue the bargained-for office space if and until it can bargain its way out of it.

The example we sometimes use in class is from NIH, one of our favorite clients. Years ago, the Secretary of HHS declared through a new policy that the work spaces within HHS would be smoke-free. He reasoned that given the word “health” in the name of his agency, he should prohibit things that by their very nature are not healthy. Great reasoning for the new policy. However, it conflicted with several local CBAs, including NIH, which had old provisions allowing designated smoking areas. There’s a big billboard-size sign as you enter the NIH main campus outside of DC that says, “Welcome to NIH, a smoke-free environment.” Every time I walk past it, I want to add an * and a footnote that says, “*Unless you’re in the bargaining units for law enforcement officers or fire fighters.”

Deb and I recently taught a program at the Naval Medical Center, Camp Lejeune. Same scenario. Years ago, the Secretary of Defense issued a policy prohibiting smoking in the health care facilities within DoD. Well, the CBA employees at Camp Lejeune are still smoking away because it’s been in their contract forever. Hey, it’s North Carolina. They’ve got to do something with all that tobacco.

The theory is this: When your local management agrees to certain office space terms in the CBA, it is actually acting on behalf of the agency head when doing so. And that agreement controls any later agency heads who come along who would like to see another policy. That’s one of the Big Deals we have to deal with when we get a new administration like we are in the processing of doing now. The new politicals come in thinking that they can shake things up (making America great again) and guys like us have to tell them that Congress passed a law 40 years ago that limits that authority in a unionized environment. The most we can do is propose changes either term or mid-term, then take them to FSIP when the union impasses us. There, at FSIP, President Trump’s seven political appointees – who serve at the pleasure of the President – will no doubt conclude that the agency head’s new policy will be the new CBA provision for office space.

What’s that? You’re telling me that the President recently fired all the FSIP members and has not yet replaced them? Oh, well. I’m sure he’ll get around to it eventually. Because you can’t implement the new policy from on high until you bargain your way out from under it. And you can’t complete bargaining without agreement until we get at least four new FSIP appointees.

The fact that there are national consultation rights does not diminish the obligation to negotiate. Consultation and negotiation are two different things, as you point out. The law is specific as to what must be negotiated (not consulted about). If the new policy included any changes to negotiable working conditions, they must be negotiated.

Not the answer you wanted, not the answer we necessarily want to give. But until Congress does something (Ha!), this is our world. [email protected]

Mandatory Spanking

,

By William Wiley, July 5, 2017

Sometimes an analogy helps us think about the law. Let’s try that by imagining that you live in a small town and that you’ve made the same mistake as has this author of having children (????).

You received an email earlier today from your fourth-grader’s teacher informing you that little Sophia has once more, for the second time this year, forgotten to do her homework. The email says that you should take “appropriate action.” You’ve already decided that when the homework-skipper gets home from her piano class, you’re going to give her a real talking to. Then, the phone rings:

You:     Hello, Smith residence.

Caller: Mrs. Smith, this is Officer O’Reilly. I’m the Discipline Officer here at Trump Elementary where you daughter, Sophia, is a student.

You:     Yes, Officer. What can I do for you?

Caller:  This just a routine call to make sure that you got the notification about your daughter’s misconduct today and to make sure that you plan to spank her before she goes to bed tonight.

You:     Why, Officer, I have no intention of spanking Sophia. All she did was forget to turn in her homework.

Caller:  I’m sorry, Mrs. Smith, but you’ll have to spank your daughter, at least three swats. You see, this is her second offense this term and Trump’s Table of Punishments calls for a minimum of spanking in a situation like this.

You:     But I don’t want to spank my daughter. I’m sure that I can get her to obey the rules some other way.

Caller:  Sorry, Mrs. Smith. I’m afraid you’ll have to spank her. All the other parents spank their children for a second offense. And our records show that two years ago, you spanked your son Jacob the second time he was late returning from recess. Our goal is consistency of punishment.

You: Consistency of punishment?

Caller:  Yes, that’s right. Punishment consistency has been declared to be the main goal of the Trump discipline program. I’m afraid that either you’ll have to spank her or we’ll have to send someone out to spank her for you.

You: You would do that? Even if I think I can correct her behavior otherwise?

Caller:  Of course. We’re interested in punishment consistency. We’re not interested in what you think might work with your child. We want to make sure that all children are treated the same, whether they need to be, or not. You don’t have a problem with that, do you? Because if you do, I just might have to refer to the Parental Table of Punishments to see if there’s something in there we need to do with you.

Pretty scary hypothetical, isn’t it, this idea that you have to punish your misbehaving kids at some preordained level for the sole purpose of consistency? Who made up this requirement that punishment must be consistent to be fair? Doesn’t it make more sense to let parents decide for themselves how to try to correct their child’s behavior, even if they choose a different method than their neighbors might use? Aren’t we really more interested in the conduct being corrected than in whether various parents use the same methods of correction?

Apparently, Congress is not. In an effort to micro-manage how federal agencies run themselves, the House recently approved HR 2131, a bill that would require DHS to take specific action to “improve” consistency in employee discipline throughout the 22 various departments and agencies that comprise DHS. As far as we can tell, it has done this without any proof that discipline is now being administered inconsistently or that consistency of penalty will somehow improve the performance of DHS employees. Some would say that it appears to have passed a bill that “sounds good,” but in fact has no value and will create an additional burden for DHS supervisors trying to hold employees accountable for their misconduct.

As you regular readers will remember, MSPB got sucked into the penalty-consistency trap back in 2010 when it issued The Terrible Trilogy, three lead decisions that for the first time in the history of our republic held that penalty consistency was the most important aspect of deciding whether a removal should be affirmed on appeal. From 2010 to 2014, the Board routinely and sometimes on its own motion demanded to know whether anyone else at the removing agency had ever done anything similar to the misconduct which was the basis for the firing on appeal. If there was, and the supervisor of that comparator had chosen not to fire the employee, the removal on appeal was set aside. Thank goodness that Sole Remaining Board Member Robbins rejected that view when he was appointed in 2012, realizing the untenable burden that mandating penalty consistency places on management officials. Under his leadership, and with the help of the changing mind of one of the other Board members, the Trilogy has been significantly undermined. Experienced practitioners know that today we are back to just about where we were before the Trilogy: as long as removal is a reasonable penalty, it will not be set aside solely because some other supervisor at the agency did not remove his employee who did the same thing.

Too bad that member Robbins isn’t Congressman Robbins. Perhaps if he were, he could have talked some sense into those who voted for HR 2131 because it “sounded good.”

I’m starting to appreciate how lucky we employment law practitioners have been for the past 40 years. In 1978, Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act, a unified and comprehensive legal structure defining the rights of civil servants and the authority of supervisors in the executive branch to actually run their agencies. Since that time, Congress has done little to change that basic structure, save for the perennial expansion of whistleblower protections (Congress loves them whistleblowers).

Lately, however, Congress seems to have decided that the executive branch agencies are not being run very well, and that Congress knows how to make that branch of the government work better: reduced official time for union representatives, shorter time limits for appeals, no MSPB review of the termination of senior executives, allowing employees to disobey lawful orders if the employee believes that the order violates some rule or regulation, extension of probationary periods, annotation of adverse findings into departed-employee’s records, reduction in an agency’s ability to use administrative leave, clawing back previous cash awards. And now, mandatory penalty consistency. Each of these changes has either already occurred legally or is being talked about as possibly occurring in the future.

This is a stupid way to run a government. Setting aside for a moment the impracticality of some of the recent legislative “fixes” that Congress has considered, it’s just not the way they taught us in high school civics that things were supposed to work. Congress, you’re supposed to provide the governmental goals and the resources to attain those goals. Then, those in the executive branch will do their best to attain those goals, and the judicial branch will decide whether the executive branch has done that fairly. A very neat and tidy system that does not work when a branch of the government without the responsibility to actually do things tries to manage the branch that actually has to provide government services.

Geez, I didn’t intend for this observation about another poorly thought-out piece of civil service legislation to evolve into a rant about the foundations of governmental responsibility. But it is what it is, as the kids say. So take from it what you will, and remember what you are paying for it. Maybe one of you smart readers out there will actually figure out what to do about it. Until then, email your senators and warn them about HR 2131. Hey, if they’re going to try to screw up the civil service one bill at a time, we’ll just have to fight back in the same way. The stakes are too high to do otherwise.

[email protected]

Everybody is a Mitigator

,

By William Wiley, June 27, 2017

If you are a repeat-reader of the FELTG newsletter, you know that we believe that agency managers should run the government. Not human resources specialists, not agency counsel, and certainly not some MSPB lawyers ensconced in a governmental ivory tower in Washington, DC (OK, it’s just a red brick six-story building, but you get the point). If we’re going to expect government managers to be held accountable for the government’s work, we should be letting them decide when removal of an employee is warranted, except in the most outlandish cases of over-reaction. In different words, that’s for the most part what the Board’s seminal penalty decision said. See Douglas v. VA, 5 MSPR 280 (1981).

When we see a case in which we think that the Board has over-reached to mitigate a removal, we are fast and furious to beat them up as best we can in a free newsletter. For example, we think that it was crazy for MSPB to require the Postal Service to reinstate a fired employee who had spent her lunch break smoking crack cocaine and marijuana and getting arrested instead of returning to work. And to this day, we do not understand how progressive discipline for an employee who has previously received 7-day and 14-day suspensions should result in a removal mitigated to a 5-day suspension for a third offense (if you need cites for these, come to our seminars). We’re relatively certain that our outspokenness about penalty mitigation has gotten us taken off MSPB’s Christmas party attendee list.

Well, now we’re probably going to be dropped from the mailing list for the Federal Circuit’s Holiday Ball. It seems that those who wear the black robes just off Lafayette Square in DC feel that they are in the better position to decide who deserves to be fired than those line managers held responsible for agency performance. The employee in a recent case before the court was an agency Chief of Police – a supervisory law enforcement officer (LEO). He directed one of his subordinates to misuse a government vehicle by running a personal errand for him. Although he initially lied about the misconduct, he eventually admitted it. The agency and the Board concluded that removal was warranted. However, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decided that removal was unreasonable and remanded for the Board to decide a lesser penalty. Tartaglia v. DVA, Fed. Cir. 2016-2226 (June 8, 2017).

In all fairness, DVA and the Board screwed up. They thought that the employee had only four years of service with DVA when he actually had 14 years of service, preceded by 5 years of military service. OK, that’s a mistake, perhaps even a significant mistake, relative to half of Douglas Factor No. 4: Work Record. However, there are 11 ½ other Douglas Factors in play, some of them seriously aggravating:

  1. Supervisors and management officials can be disciplined more seriously than non-supervisors. Cantu v. Treasury, 88 MSPR 253 (2001), Edwards v. USPS, 116 MSPR 173 (2010).
  2. Law enforcement officers can be disciplined more seriously than non-LEOs. Hanker v. Treasury, 73 MSPR 159 (1997).
  3. LEOs who engage in dishonest conduct that results in discipline may become Giglio impaired, thereby reducing or eliminating their ability to testify as witnesses in criminal trials. See Taylor v. Air Force, MSPB No. DC-0752-12-0296-I-1 (NP)(2013).

Does a 15-year mistake in consideration of the individual’s employment history mean he should not be fired for directing his subordinate to engage in illegal behavior? Well, here at FELTG, we do not claim to know. But with all due respect, neither do the three judges who heard this appeal in the Federal Circuit. We do know that a plain old run-of-the-mill non-supervisory federal employee is supposed to get a minimum 30-day suspension for the statutory misuse of a government vehicle. If that is the base line, what do we go up to for a Police Chief who lied about his misconduct initially, and engaged a subordinate employee in an illegal act? Given that long suspensions are harmful to the agency as often as they are to an employee, and given that a long suspension is no more likely to curtail future misconduct than a shorter one, what in the world is the court thinking is appropriate in this situation? The court’s remand expressly provides that removal is an excessive penalty. What does the court think is left?

For whatever it’s worth, we’ve argued for several FELTG years that when the Board or court finds a penalty to be excessive, rather than trying to apply Douglas factors after some of the specifications have failed, the case should be remanded to the agency for redetermination of the penalty given the facts remaining in the case. As some of the charges and specifications fell out on appeal, that’s what should have been done in this case, in our humble opinion.

So far, we’re looking at about two years of back pay with interest, plus what will no doubt be a substantial (and well-deserved) lawyer fee claim. With the Board down to only one member, who knows when the remand decision will be issued that actually results in a ruling on an appropriate penalty. The back pay will continue to accrue for many months.

Hey, DVA; we love you guys. If you were to ask us for advice (which you haven’t because we charge excessively outrageous fees for our opinions), we’d suggest that you cancel the removal, reinstate Mr. Tartaglia immediately, and forget about waiting for a remand decision from the Board on some lesser penalty. Cut your losses. Get some work out of the guy in exchange for the money you’ll have to pay him anyway. Yes, you got scrogged by the court. But did we give up when the Germans bombed Pearl Harbor? (Warning: link contains language NSFW). Heck no we didn’t. Just put this one on the cases-we-shouldn’t-have-lost list and move on. Soon, you’ll have a new discipline system, and you’ll never have to worry about mitigation again. [email protected]

 

 

 

A View of the Future (Some Might Say a Dark View)

,

By William Wiley, June 20, 2017

It has begun. Congress and the White House (and a large group of our fellow citizens) seem to think that it is too hard to fire a bad federal employee. From the pages of this newsletter over the years, you’ve heard us shouting from the rooftops that it really isn’t that hard, if you know what you’re doing. And here at the Federal Employment Law Training Group, we’ve done everything we can, short of compulsory servitude, to help you guys know what to do.

Unfortunately, our efforts fell short. Even though the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 gave agencies terrific tools to hold bad employees accountable while honoring civil servant rights and protections, Congress has felt the need to change those tools, at least at one agency. And it has been widely reported by those inside Capitol Hill that if Congress comes to conclude that these changes actually make accountability easier, Congress will be acting to make these new rules apply to everybody – at least everybody currently a civil servant appointed under Title V.

Last week, the President signed into law the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017. That piece of legislation in large part grew out of Congress’s frustration with the apparent inability of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to remove and otherwise punish DVA employees who allegedly caused veterans to suffer because of poor management within the veteran’s health care system. The law is supposed to “fix” some of the systemic problems in the oversight of discipline in DVA, based in part on a belief by Congress that MSPB has done a poor job of defending our veterans and neglecting to uphold the disciplining of certain senior executives.

Here at good old FELTG, we don’t agree with this premise, but our opinions are worth exactly what you pay for them.

Everybody in our business, or even interested in our business, needs to know the changes that this legislation has created. Even though most of us do not work at DVA and will not be directly affected by the new law, what we see in this act might very well soon be applicable to the entire federal service. So, never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee (that’s John Donne, in case you were wondering).

There are new requirements that will apply to DVA besides the ones we identify below. For example, DVA will have to establish its own internal whistleblower protection unit with a Presidential appointee running it, independent of OGC. But in this article, we’re comparing the procedural changes that apply for those of us down here in the weeds trying to hold employees accountable. If you need more details than we are providing, make yourself delirious reading the new law, found at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1094/text.

Before we get into the details, we have to point out an amazing bit of word-twisting in this legislation (thanks to an astute participant in our MSPB Law Week seminar we just finished in San Francisco). Whereas nearly every other piece of legislation ever written relative to the civil service speaks of “days” (by common understanding to mean “calendar days”), this act sometimes specifies “business days” (b-days) and at other times simply specifies “days” (for purposes of this article, to be known as c-days.) In the charts below, we’re going to harmonize days for comparison purposes, so that we’re comparing apples to apples. You purists out there can do you own conversions from c-days to b-days, if that makes you happier.

So why the added confusing of specifying b-days sometimes and c-days at other times? Ah, my little Pollyannas. Welcome to the world of politically-created reality. If I say that something has been reduced from 30 days to 15 days, that sounds like a lot of reduction. However, if I say that something has been reduced from 22 days to 15 days (30 c-days are 22 b-days), not so much. It appears to this writer that someone wanted it to look like a greater change was being made by this new law than is really being made. We leave it up to you to come up with a better theory.

Procedures for Removing Bad Federal Employees; a Comparison

  Current Procedures DVA SES DVA GS
Notice of proposed removal All evidence and a right to representation Same Same
Minimum response to proposal period 5 b-days 7 b-days 7 b-days
Minimum time to implement removal 22 b-days 15 b-days 15 b-days
Maximum period to decide to remove None 15 b-days 15 b-days
Appeal MSPB DVA grievance MSPB
Time to file appeal 22 b-days [not specified] 10 b-days
Evidence burden Preponderance (51%) [not specified] Substantial (±40%)
Time to decide appeal 120 c-days (goal) 21 c-days 180 c-days (firm)
Mitigation authority? Yes [not specified] No
Challenge to appeal Fed Circuit Court Fed District Court Fed Circuit Court

There are some amazing little nuggets tucked away in here, if you know what to look for. As an example, by using the confusing b-day language, the law actually increases the minimum response time for a removal (and also for a short suspension). Dollars to donuts that was not the intent of the drafters. Separately, the language placing a time limit on MSPB’s review of an appeal by a GS employee refers to the decision by the “administrative judge.” Well, what about the time required for the three Board members to consider the petition for review of the AJ’s decision? Or, does the law’s language that the 180 c-day time limit applies to “a final and complete decision” of the AJ mean that there is no AJ decision review by the Board members?

From an employment law position, one of the most significant changes here is the reduction of the agency’s burden of proof in a misconduct removal from a preponderance of the evidence to the lower substantial evidence standard. Yet even if legally significant, a quick review of the reversed DVA cases that got Congress all riled up does not reveal a problem with the preponderance standard of proof. For example, in Graves v. DVA, CH-0707016-0180-J-1 (2016), an SES demotion case, the judge believed DVA’s evidence and upheld the charge. However, she found the penalty to be unreasonable because a superior to the appellant did the same thing that the appellant did, and he was not disciplined. I’m running stupid as to how lowering the evidence standard from preponderance to substantial would have caused the judge to reach a different conclusion. The judge agreed with the facts, but did not agree with DVA’s judgment about what to do with the facts.

By far, the most significant change for those of us on the front line is the no-mitigation of the penalty change. Probably half of the effort that goes into a removal case these days is defending the penalty. The stupid disparate-penalty Terrible Trilogy philosophy that the Board members dreamed up in 2010 has scared us all so much that agencies have become afraid to fire people because some other employee somewhere else in the agency did the same thing and was only suspended. Apparently, the Douglas Factors will no longer apply. Or, will they? Since the Board can no longer mitigate a penalty, will it just start setting aside the removal altogether if it disagrees with the seriousness of the charge? Or, will it uphold a removal for a five-minute tardy, outstanding performer, 20-year clean record, if DVA concludes that removal is the proper penalty? So many questions to be answered as the case law develops.

And that won’t be happening anytime soon because the Board decision-making machinery has been inoperable since the first week of the year. If we have usable precedent by this time next year, I’ll be amazed.

Finally, there are some statutory “fixes” in here that make no sense. For example, the act says that, “A covered individual so demoted may not be placed on administrative leave during the period during which an appeal (if any) under this section is ongoing, and may only receive pay if the covered individual reports for duty or is approved to use accrued unused annual, sick, family medical, military, or court leave.” Well, gee willikers, we never placed employees on administrative leave in that situation anyway. Might as well pass a law that says, “Things that fall must fall down, not up.”

It appears to us here at FELTG that the drafters of this legislation do not understand our system. I mean no disrespect by that statement as ours is a complicated statute. However, if we’re going to see any new big across-government legislative fixes to federal employment laws, for the good of our country, let’s all hope that the staffers on Capitol Hill who draft legislation like this take the time to figure out what changes will really make a difference. This is not something to gut-out and do what feels good. This is something crying out for professional thought and deep experience.

Operators are standing by: 1-888-at-FELTG. The first six minutes of consultation are free. [email protected].

Good News, Y’all: Sometimes Telework is NOT a Reasonable Accommodation

, ,

By Deborah Hopkins, June 14, 2017

Out of all the training classes we present here at FELTG, maybe the biggest area where we get questions, comments, complaints, and yes even tears of frustration, is the discussion of telework as a reasonable accommodation for disability. Telework is often an effective accommodation to allow someone to perform the essential functions of her job; it’s just fabulous when it works.  Sometimes, though, telework is not a good option, yet agencies are afraid to say “no” to someone who brings in a doctor’s note that says “Employee X needs to telework because of a medical condition” because they fear getting in trouble if they deny the request or ask for more information.

Does this sound familiar? If so, then it’s time to rejoice, because I have a few points to share that will help you legally deny telework as accommodation:

  1. When the employee does not have a medically-documented disability. If an employee claims to have a disability and requests telework as accommodation, that employee must provide medical documentation that says they have a physical or mental impairment that affects their ability to perform an essential function of the job. The employee must also explain to the agency how the accommodation (in this case, telework) would allow him to perform that essential function from home. If the person does not provide medical documentation, then you do NOT have to grant him telework because he is NOT qualified. In other words, if he refuses to provide specific medical documentation (diagnosis, prognosis, functional limitations), then he waives his entitlement to the reasonable accommodation process. See Complainant v. DLA, EEOC Appeal No. 0120114081 (2013) (employee’s medical documentation was vague and did not describe the limitations on her essential functions, so the agency was not obligated to accommodate her request). No documentation, no disability. No disability, no accommodation.
  2. When telework is not an effective accommodation. Some jobs can’t be done from home because the essential functions require the person to be onsite. In those cases, telework is not an effective accommodation and should not be granted. See Humphries v. Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120113552 (2013) (telework was not an effective accommodation because face-to-face interaction with clients was an essential function of the employee’s job); Gemmill v. FAA, EEOC Appeal No. 0120072201 (2009) (telework was not an effective accommodation because the employee needed to access computer systems and confidential documents that were kept securely at the agency facility). If an essential function of the job requires the employee to be at work to do something, and the employee can’t be at work to do the thing, and no accommodation at work will allow the employee to do the thing, the employee is not a qualified individual.
  3. When an employee has a performance problem. Some employees just can’t be successful while teleworking. If an employee is having performance problems in the workplace with direct supervision, you can easily see how granting telework, where the employee does not have direct supervision, might make that performance issue even worse. See Yeargins v. HUD, EEOC Petition No. 0320100021 (2010) (agency properly denied telework as accommodation because the employee, an EEO specialist, lacked sufficient knowledge of civil rights laws to work independently). EEOC has also upheld agency denials of telework as accommodation because of past performance issues that occurred while the employee was teleworking. See Robinson v. DOE, 586 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2009) (agency properly denied telework as accommodation after the employee demonstrated an inability to satisfactorily perform her job while teleworking; in 477 hours of telework the employee only completed a half-page document work product).
  4. When another accommodation is effective. More good news: the agency, and not the employee, gets to choose the accommodation, as long as it is effective. See, e.g., Don S. v. BOP, EEOC Appeal No. 0120141175 (2016). Sure, a lot of employees request telework as accommodation, but if the employee can perform the essential functions of the job with an accommodation in the workplace, the agency has fulfilled its obligation and is not required to grant telework. See Complainant v. Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120122847 (2014) (though the employee requested telework, the agency effectively accommodated her disabilities at work by providing her with a wheelchair, a special parking spot, and a change in minor job duties she could perform within her medical restrictions); Dennis v. Department of Education, EEOC Appeal No. 0120090193 (2010) (an enclosed work area was reasonable accommodation for an employee with perfume allergies); Gilbertz v. CDC, EEOC Appeal No. 0120110026 (2012) (providing the employee with a quieter work area was an effective accommodation for the employee’s hearing problem).

Now that you know there are times you can deny telework as accommodation, we warn you not to go too overboard with your Telework Denied stamp. There are few things to keep in mind:

  1. Telework does not have to be all or nothing. In many cases, telework is an effective accommodation some of the time. If an employee has a job that requires some contact with customers onsite, but other essential functions can be done at home, granting a few hours of telework per week is a reasonable accommodation. See Petzer v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A50812 (2006) (sixteen hours of telework per week was an appropriate accommodation because the employee needed the remainder of the workweek to access databases that were only available at the agency); Skarica v. DHS, EEOC Appeal No. 0120073399 (2010) (telework for two hours per day was an effective accommodation because it permitted the employee to use his own private restroom to self-administer a catheter for his medical condition).
  2. Telework as reasonable accommodation falls outside general agency telework policies. Telework as reasonable accommodation, in essence, trumps your agency’s general telework policy. For example, if your telework policy says employees are only eligible for telework after they complete a probationary period, but you have a probationary employee who requests telework as disability accommodation, you can’t just say no because he’s a probationer and the policy prohibits him from telework; you have to consider whether telework is an effective accommodation. If there is no other accommodation available, and telework will allow him to perform the essential functions of his job, then you must grant him telework as an accommodation. EEOC Fact Sheet: Work at Home/Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation. See also Dahlman v. CPSC, EEOC Appeal No. 0120073190 (2010) (agency permitted an exception to its telework policy and allowed a new employee to telework one day per week if, after 30 days, she demonstrated her ability to work independently).
  3. The agency’s obligation is to accommodate the qualified employee and nobody else. Only qualified individuals with disabilities are entitled to reasonable accommodation. An agency does not have an obligation to accommodate a non-disabled employee who requests telework so she can better take care of a family member who has a disability. See Key-Scott v. USUS, EEOC Appeal No. 0120100193 (2012) (Agency did not violate the law when it denied an employee’s request for telework so she could take better care of her disabled son).

Note: please keep in mind that if no other accommodation except telework is effective, a conservative approach that will check the “good faith” box might be to grant the employee a 30-day Telework Trial to see if the employee is capable of successful performance while working from home. With the recent decisions coming out of the EEOC, you just might want to show that you did this before you use that Telework Denied stamp.

There’s lots more on this topic (including what your obligations are in accommodating a disabled employee’s commute) next week during the 90-minute webinar Telework and Leave as Reasonable Accommodation, so if you’re interested please sign up. [email protected]

Field Report from the EEOC’s Baltimore Field Office’s “Meet the Administrative Judges” Program

, ,

By Deryn Sumner, June 14, 2017

Last month, the EEOC’s Baltimore Field Office held an event that provides an opportunity to agency representatives, complainant’s advocates, and others to informally meet the administrative judges and ask questions.  I’ll begin this article with two caveats.  One, although I have attended the event in the past, I did not attend this year.  So my report comes from those in my office who did attend.  And two, although these reflect the viewpoints of the administrative judges in the Baltimore Field Office, I think they are good pointers for anyone appearing before the EEOC.  However, regardless of what any other administrative judge tells you, always review and follow any requirements set forth by your assigned administrative judge in the Case Management Order and any other orders.

With those qualifying statements out of the way, here are the highlights of what the Administrative Judges discussed during the event in Baltimore.

  • When responding to discovery requests, make sure you are not just providing boilerplate response, as that’s not really a response, and the administrative judge may conclude that your side has waived its right to fully respond.
  • Before filing a motion to compel discovery, make sure you have had substantive meet and confer communications.  Some judges in Baltimore require you to have discussed the deficiencies by telephone before filing a motion.  And some judges (including several in the Washington Field Office) require that you convene a telephone conference with both the other side and the administrative judge before filing a motion to compel.
  • If you do end up filing a motion to compel, parties should list the interrogatory in question, provide the other side’s response, and explain why the response is deficient and why the information being requested is material to your case.  Although you should attach the relevant documents, make sure you have argued your points in the motion.
  • When filing a dispositive motion, include an enumerated statement of facts and include all facts that you are referencing in your argument and analysis in this statement of facts.  The analysis section will be much shorter if you have already stated the facts.
  • If you haven’t received a ruling on a dispositive motion and there’s a hearing date approaching, make a request for an oral argument on the pending motion or request a status conference.
  • Remember that under the revised MD-110, agencies must ask administrative judges for permission to obtain medical documents from pro se complainants.

I don’t know if other EEOC field or district offices hold such events.  If they don’t, they should, as it is an excellent opportunity for a dialogue about what is important to everyone involved in the federal sector EEO process.  [email protected]

Well, We Never Saw This One Before

, ,

By William Wiley, June 14, 2017

Here at FELTG, we’ve seen a lot of things. In fact, sometimes we smile when someone comes up to us at a seminar and says, “I have a very unusual situation.” Ha, ha, ha, we chuckle silently. It might be unusual to you, Buddy, but we’ve seen it all before. As Farmers Insurance says in their TV ad, “We know a thing or two because we’ve seen a thing or two.” Yeah, us too.

So the incoming question below took us back a bit. We’re comfortable with the answer, but we have to admit, we’ve not run into this situation before. And there’s certainly no case law to rely upon. From a long-time reader:

Dear FELTG-ites,

I am a LER Specialist at a federal agency.  While assisting a manager in addressing the poor performance of an employee, we discovered that the employee’s work was being completed by a full-time union official. When confronted, the employee admitted the union rep had done the work for him.  After confronting the union official about the misuse of official time, he declared that official time was necessary to assist one of the unit’s members. How should I approach taking action against the union official?

Our FELTG response:

Dear Loyal Reader-

The answer as far as we’re concerned is strictly political.

  • We discipline to correct behavior. In other words, we don’t do it to punish. Therefore, if you can stop the union official from doing this again, you have done America a service.
  • The harm to the agency as to a loss of time is not significant. One way or the other, the union official was not going to be doing his regular government job. In fact, one could argue that he actually did the agency a service because instead of doing union business, he was doing productive agency work. Maybe he should get a Special Act award.
  • That last sentence is a joke, by the way :).
  • We’d say you have three options:
  1. If you want to keep your union/management relationship low key, you write the official a big fancy letter from the head of labor relations that tells him that doing what he did is harmful to the agency and that you will not tolerate it in the future. If he wants to do government work, he can cut back from full time union representation and return to his regular position.
  2. If you want to fire things up a bit, or don’t really care about the tenor of your relationship with the union, you can discipline the union official with a Reprimand. He will then file a ULP or a grievance, and you’ll be off to the races. Make sure you AWOL him for any time he spent doing this guy’s work so that he loses pay.
  3. Or, you can ignore the union official. Focus on the employee who misled his supervisor by having someone else do his work. That, combined with unacceptable performance just might warrant a removal. If I thought about it longer, I might even conclude that if all this occurred during a PIP, you could discount the work done by the union official, fail the employee during the PIP, and have yourself a nice easy 432 removal. Take this route and I guarantee that the union official won’t try this again.

I have been doing federal employment law for 40 years. This is the first time I have run into this one. Thanks for making my day.

By the way, folks. If you’ve seen that Farmers Insurance ad mentioned above, you know that the stories are told as the old guy walks the young guy around the Farmers “Hall of Claims” museum that is dedicated to all the surprising accidental mishaps that Farmers has insured over the years. That got me thinking; wouldn’t it be cool if we had a museum like that for all the crazy things that federal employees have done that got themselves fired? I can just see the tourists lining up on The Mall now. [email protected]

Psychiatric Examinations – One More Time

, ,

By Barbara Haga, June 14, 2017

Last month I wrote about “unnecessary barriers” that are included in agency performance plans and union contracts, that inhibit the ability of an agency to take action on performance problems.  This month we’re going to take a look at the OPM regulations on medical examinations.  Talk about some “unnecessary barriers.”  So, President Trump, if you want some more things to put on the list of what is getting in the way of doing what needs to be done, here’s one for you.

Quick Review – Physical Examinations

OPM’s medical examination regulations set conditions for when physical and psychiatric examinations may be ordered and offered.  If you’ve been a FELTG reader for a while, you have heard one or more of us discussing how the OPM regulations are more restrictive than what the EEOC would say about a medical inquiry being job-related and consistent with business necessity.  To sum up the regulations quickly, these are the conditions where a physical examination can be ordered (5 CFR 330.301(b)-(d)):

  • The applicant or employee has applied for or occupies a position that has medical standards and/or physical requirements, or is covered by a medical evaluation program.
  • An employee who is receiving COP or compensation from OWCP may be required to report for an examination to determine medical limitations that may affect job placement decisions.
  • An employee is being released from her competitive level in a RIF. She may be required to undergo a relevant medical evaluation if the position to which she has assignment rights has medical standards and/or physical requirements that are different from those required in her current position.

That’s it.  Number 2 is not going to come up that often and Number 3 is exceedingly rare, so the authority to order physical examinations really boils down only to Number 1.  That means that for all of the white-collar jobs that don’t have medical standards for their work (like Criminal Investigators, Firefighters, and Air Traffic Controllers do) or physical requirements set in their jobs (like an HR specialist who has to be able to drive a government vehicle to travel to remote sites that he is responsible for servicing), there is no way to require the employee to report for medical examination.

This lack of authority ties management’s hands no matter what kind of problems the employee is having on the job – whether it is an IT Specialist who can’t be regular in his attendance or a technician reporting to duty after a recent diagnosis of MRSA.

Quick Review – Psychiatric Examinations

The regulations on psychiatric examinations (5 CFR 339.301(e)) are even more restrictive.  These may only be ordered if the job says you have to be sane to do it, and there aren’t many.  Okay, I embellished a little.  The regulation says that a psychiatric examination or psychological assessment is part of the medical standards for a position having medical standards or required under a medical evaluation program.  What kinds of jobs would these include?  Criminal investigators, police officers, and other similar positions.

The only other time that a psychiatric examination can be ordered is when the agency had authority to order a physical exam, and that physical exam doesn’t give an explanation for behavior or actions that may affect the safe and efficient performance of the applicant or employee, the safety of others, and/or the vulnerability of business operation and information systems to potential threats.  So, we would be limited to jobs that fall under Number 1 in the prior section for this authority to apply.

A Glimmer of Hope

Imagine my excitement in December when OPM put out proposed 339 regulations.  I was hoping that all of the pages of print pointing out that the regulations were too restrictive and prevent agencies from dealing with real workplace situations in an effective way were finally going to bear fruit.  It didn’t take long to realize that this was not to be.  The final regulations were effective on March 21, 2017.  They were caught up in the review of regulations by the incoming administration.  Unfortunately, these weren’t stopped.  So, the conditions described above for ordering exams are virtually the same as they were before the revision.

What’s the Big Deal?

If you have ever had the unfortunate experience of working on a case where the employee continues to report to work when he is clearly not able to perform, you will appreciate why these restrictive regulations are a problem.  When all of the suggesting and brilliant written notices you can come up with have not convinced the employee that something has to be done to resolve the situation, what are you supposed to do?

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation had just such a problem.  The case is Doe v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 117 MSPR 579 (2012).  Their GS-13 Administrative Officer was exhibiting “unusual and inappropriate behavior.”  Through emails and in-person interactions with agency employees, she accused them of breaking into her home, providing information to a transit officer about her location on a train, orchestrating things to happen to her at work and outside of work, listening to her work conversations, communicating with each other at work via earpieces, observing her at work via hidden cameras, and having a hidden agenda toward her.

An Administrative Officer job wouldn’t normally have physical requirements that would have allowed the agency to order a physical exam to rule out physical causes of her behavior.  The agency asked a Federal Occupational Health medical professional review the statements. The medical professional determined that the employee exhibited paranoid behavior, could be a danger to herself or others, and should undergo a fitness for duty exam.

PBGC had authority under their union contract to do the examination, and so they sent the employee to be seen by a mental health professional.  The answer that came back was that she was experiencing a psychotic delusional disorder and was not fit.

The consequences of ordering that examination must seem never-ending to the PBGC staff.  There was another Board ruling in 2016 and an EEOC decision in February of this year on this case.  Check back next month for the next chapter.