I taught a webinar a few weeks ago and covered a case that created quite a bit of conversation, and even some debate. Deryn Sumner wrote about this particular case in the FELTG newsletter a few months ago, but since not everyone had a chance to read that article – or perhaps they read it and still have questions or concerns – I want to revisit it from a slightly different perspective.
Here’s the situation:
A transgender female employee was denied a chance to make a presentation during a Bible study meeting held by an employee-run religious organization that met within a federal agency. The organization was created and recognized under the agency’s Employee Organization Policy, which meant that it was sponsored by a senior executive, met on agency premises, used agency resources (such as email and newsletters), and even received compensation from the agency to travel to events.
The employee was denied the chance to make her presentation, even after she offered to present as a man during the meeting. When asked why the request was denied the organization’s president, also an agency employee, said she did not want to promote a “transgender lifestyle” among the Bible study members because that went against the beliefs of the group.
Many folks on the webinar saw logic in this thought; others did not. Hang with me here.
The transgender female employee filed a discrimination complaint and the agency initially dismissed it for failure to state a claim, asserting that it was the organization’s president acting in that role, and not the agency, that refused to allow the employee to make her presentation.
On appeal, EEOC reversed the dismissal and remanded the case back to the agency after finding that the employee stated a viable claim for hostile work environment harassment.
Why the remand, you might ask? EEOC said that the president’s use of the term “transgender lifestyle” could “reasonably be perceived as offensive, as it is indicating that transgender people somehow are different from others and have a different lifestyle than others, and as a result, they should be treated differently.” EEOC also said that not allowing someone to dress conducive to the gender with which they identify, is “humiliating and dehumanizing” and that refusing to allow a transgender employee to make a presentation “causes further alienation” among coworkers, and interferes with her work environment. Finally, EEOC said that if the agency failed to take immediate and appropriate action to stop the harassment, the agency could be found liable for the harassment.
So here’s where the discussion came in: a number of participants asked how the EEOC could (or whether it should) get so involved in a voluntary, employee-run organization’s free exercise of religion. How could the EEOC supersede the group members’ decisions to determine who was allowed to make a presentation during a meeting – especially when the person who requested to make the presentation had a lifestyle that did not match the core beliefs of the group?
Some asked whether this perhaps stated a claim of religious discrimination and whether the organization might have standing to file a complaint. EEOC addressed this potential claim, and said that it is a violation of the law to subject one employee to a discriminatory hostile work environment in order to accommodate another employee’s religious beliefs.
Still with me here? Because the organization was created and recognized by the agency’s Employee Organization Policy and used agency resources, the laws that apply to the agency at large (here, we’re talking about civil rights laws) apply to this employee-run organization as well. The agency had the duty to investigate and promptly correct any discrimination or harassment that came from the organization’s members, who were the complainant’s coworkers, because their conduct was reasonably related to the complainant’s work within the agency.
Were it not for this connection with the agency, there would probably not be potential agency liability here. For example, if the group was made up of agency employees but was entirely independent, unaffiliated with the agency, did not use any agency resources, and met after work hours off agency premises, the complainant might not be able to show that her exclusion was reasonably related to her day job.
A word of caution moving forward: the same analysis would apply to similar organizations that attempted to discriminate against others because of other protected classes: race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age, disability, genetic information. Whether you agree or disagree with this reasoning, this remains true: you just can’t do it; Hillier v. IRS, EEOC Appeal No. 0120150248 (April 21, 2016). Hopkins@FELTG.com