When Calling Your Supervisor a “F*cking Motherf*cker” is NOT a Removable Offense
By Deborah J. Hopkins, April 29, 2025
Key facts:
- The appellant experienced a stress-induced heart attack at work.
- He was removed for inappropriate conduct after yelling and cursing at his supervisor including multiple uses of the f-word, when his supervisor did not immediately sign a workers compensation form related to the heart attack.
- The AJ mitigated the removal to a 30-day suspension, finding the deciding official did not appropriately consider mitigating factors, and the Board agreed.
Over coffee the other morning, I finally caught up on my case reading: about 100 MSPB nonprecedential cases that have been issued in the last several weeks.
One that caught my attention was Rike v. Navy, PH-0752-23-0075-I-1 (Mar. 31, 2025)(NP), where the agency removed the appellant, GS-12 Supply Management Specialist, for inappropriate behavior. The appellant had “yelled and cursed at [his supervisor], called him a “f*cking liar” and a “[f]*cking [m]other [f]*cker,” and “demanded that [the supervisor] sign” a workers compensation document about the appellant’s recent workplace-related health episode – a heart attack caused by stress. Id. at 3. The appellant had been disciplined twice prior to this incident.
Under Board precedent, agencies can usually justify removal for a third offense of just about any misconduct based on multiple instances of prior discipline. And here, the appellant’s disciplinary record included a letter of reprimand for unauthorized absence, lack of candor, and failure to follow instructions, and a 14 -day suspension for failure to comply with timekeeping procedures. Id. at 7.
The administrative judge (AJ) mitigated the removal to a 30-day suspension and the Board agreed, finding the agency’s Douglas factors analysis was flawed because the deciding official (DO) did not give proper consideration to several mitigating factors.
The case points out, “In concurring with the proposing official’s analysis, the deciding official assigned more weight to the appellant’s prior unrelated discipline.” Id.
The Board continued:
Although the Board generally will not discount a prior disciplinary record because it is for an unrelated offense, if the nature of the prior misconduct is sufficiently different from the charges in the proposal at issue, the difference may significantly diminish the weight of that prior discipline in determining a proper penalty. See Skates v. Department of the Army, 69 M.S.P.R. 366, 369 (1996); Lewis v. Department of the Air Force, 51 M.S.P.R. 475, 484 (1991). As such, we are unconvinced that the appellant’s attendance-related discipline, which is sufficiently different from the charged inappropriate behavior, outweighs his 10 years of service, which was free from the discipline at issue here.
Id.
The Board also addressed other mitigating factors and found the DO did not give them appropriate consideration:
- The appellant’s stress levels which caused his on-duty heart attack;
- The appellant’s allegations of bullying and harassment from his immediate supervisor and other management officials, which included a pending EEO complaint against his supervisor;
- The appellant’s satisfactory performance evaluations;
- The agency’s identified comparator employees had engaged in multiple instances of disrespectful conduct while the appellant engaged in a single instance;
- The appellant’s supervisor was also yelling and shouting during the altercation; and
- Instances of shouting and using inappropriate language were common in the shipyard.
Despite the Board’s statement that they acknowledged “the seriousness of the charge against the appellant and do not minimize its gravity,” id. at 9, they agreed with the AJ that a 30-day suspension was the maximum reasonable penalty. All the more reason for the PO to do a full Douglas analysis, and the DO to give a full explanation of all the Douglas factors – aggravating and mitigating – at hearing. [email protected]
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