By Deborah Hopkins, January 21, 2020

My colleague Bill Wiley has long preached the value of taking the easy route vs. the hard route. An example he has often used in our Washington, DC classes goes something like this:

If you’re in Washington, DC, and you want to get to Baltimore, the fastest and most direct way to get there is to take I-95 north. Of course, there are other ways to get to Baltimore from DC. You could hop on I-66 and head out toward West Virginia, come up north across western Maryland and on into central Pennsylvania, then drive east on the Pennsylvania turnpike before heading to Baltimore south on I-95 via Philadelphia. But why would you take the long route and waste all that time and fuel, when you could be there in less than an hour by taking the quickest route?

I want to look at  a 2019 Federal Circuit decision [PDF] with this easy-vs-hard approach in mind. The case involves a VA psychologist named Eric Cerwonka who was removed from his position as a Clinical Psychologist at a VA medical center in Alexandria, La. Cerwonka appealed his removal to the MSPB and ultimately petitioned for review by the Federal Circuit.

Here’s what happened: The state of Louisiana took away Cerwonka’s license to practice for “clear ethical violations and a repeated failure to follow the rules and regulations binding upon [him] as a psychologist.” Once the VA learned Cerwonka’s license had been revoked, it proposed his removal based on one charge: failure to maintain a current license, in violation of 38 U.S.C. § 7402(f). The statute provides that a psychologist “may not be employed” by the VA if even one of his licenses is terminated for cause.

Cerwonka appealed to Louisiana over the license revocation. The state temporarily reinstated his license, as is typical procedure in appeals of license revocations. Cerwonka appealed his removal to the MSPB and argued that the subsequent reinstatement of his license meant the VA did not have cause to remove him because he once again had his license to practice.

The Board’s role in these cases – and thus the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction in appeals and PFRs – is limited to reviewing Federal agency personnel actions and determining whether those actions were proper at the time they were made. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(f) (defining the term “appeal” to the Board as “[a] request for review of an agency action”).

In the initial decision, the AJ concluded that the agency action under review — Cerwonka’s removal — was proper at the time it was made. Because Cerwonka’s Louisiana license had been revoked, for cause, at the time the agency removed him from employment, he did not have a license on the day the agency issued his removal, and Cerwonka did not present any evidence to refute this fact. The express terms of the statute compels removal and does not permit the VA to consider subsequent events, such as the reinstatement of a license at a later date. The Federal Circuit put it this way:

To the extent Cerwonka is arguing that the Board must consider subsequent events or that there should be a waiting period prior to removal to give an opportunity for an appeal, those arguments find no support in the statute, and we decline Cerwonka’s invitation to read exceptions into the express terms of 38 U.S.C. § 7402(f).

Which brings me to the point of this article. The agency could have drafted up a fancy proposed removal with perhaps multiple charges revealing Cerwonka’s misconduct and how the ethical violations he engaged in caused harm to the agency. It could have proven the facts, and the elements of each charge, by a preponderance of the evidence. And it could have justified the removal penalty by showing that because Cerwonka’s ethics were called into question, he was no longer trustworthy in his role and, accordingly, the agency lost confidence is his ability to do his job. Then if Cerwonka had appealed to the MSPB, the agency could have defended its charges. As we teach in FELTG training classes, doing that is not nearly as difficult as you might think.

However, in this case, the agency made a smart call. Rather than try to build a case over misconduct, it took an even easier and more efficient route by proposing removal for failure to maintain a current license:

  1. A license is required to have this job today;
  2. Your license is revoked as of today;
  3. No license = you’re fired.

Get where you want to be the easiest way. Take I-95 to Baltimore – or better yet take the MARC or Amtrak – rather than go the circuitous route. Make your life easier, when you can. [email protected]

By Deborah Hopkins, January 14, 2020

When Bill Wiley and I teach MSPB Law Week (next held in Washington, DC March 9-13), we get a lot of great questions.

And occasionally, we get pushback from an attendee on some of our practice methods. One hot topic that always generates discussion – and the occasional challenge – is where to use the Douglas Factors analysis in a removal case.

We have written about this topic multiple times, because it’s a topic people always have questions about. So it’s a fitting discussion for the first newsletter of the year, and the decade.

At FELTG, our approach is to attach a Douglas Factors Worksheet to the proposal notice. We don’t just do that because we think we’re smart; we do that because the law requires us to give the employee the reasons relied upon for the proposed action, and attaching said worksheet ensures we comply with the law, every single time.

Here’s a direct quote from Douglas v. VA, 5 MSPR 280 (1981):

[A]ggravating factors on which the agency intends to rely for imposition of an enhanced penalty, such as a prior disciplinary record, should be included in the advance notice of charges so that the employee will have a fair opportunity to respond to those alleged factors …

That’s right, all the way back in 1981 when the ink was barely dry on the Civil Service Reform Act, the famous Douglas decision laid out 12 factors to consider in determining a penalty for misconduct, and the aggravating factors (those factors which work against the employee and weigh in favor of a harsher penalty) must be included in the proposal notice.

And who is responsible for the proposal notice? The Proposing Official (PO), of course, usually in conjunction with an advisor from L/ER or OGC. The proposal letter, along with any attachments, such as a Douglas Factors Worksheet, is what gives the employee the “advance notice” required by the Douglas decision.

Sometimes a person in our class wants to get into a debate about why we include all 12 factors in the proposal when Douglas only requires the employee to be given notice of the aggravating factors.

It is true that the legal minimum is to give the employee only the aggravating factors, but at FELTG this is one of the few times we go beyond the legal minimum. We don’t want to get into a fight about whether a particular factor is aggravating or mitigating, so we include them all upfront.

One of the examples we use in class to illustrate this principle is length of service. Let’s say the employee has worked for your agency for nine years. Is that length of service aggravating or mitigating? The PO might think it’s mitigating, but if the Deciding Official (DO) thinks it’s aggravating and we haven’t given the employee the “Length of Service” factor in the proposal notice, we run the risk of a due process violation. In addition, the Federal Circuit has highlighted that the employee must be put on notice of any penalty factors on which the Board is going to rely in making its decision. Ward v. USPS, No. 2010-3021 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

If the Proposal Letter contains only three or four aggravating factors, and the Deciding Official does a full Douglas analysis and decides there’s a fifth aggravating factor and does not provide notice to the employee, that DO has committed a due process violation because the employee has now been denied his legal right to fully defend himself. That due process violation is an automatic loser, regardless of the evidence on the merits.

The safest thing to do is to include all the Douglas factors in the proposal. Then we don’t have to make the call on whether a factor that could go either way is more aggravating or mitigating. Makes sense, doesn’t it?

Here’s the process:

  1. Employee is given the proposal notice, an attached Douglas Factors Worksheet, and any evidence relied upon.
  2. Employee responds to the Deciding Official based on the proposal notice and its attachments.
  3. Deciding Official makes a decision based only on the proposal, which includes the Douglas Factors worksheet, and the employee’s response.

As discussed above, the Douglas decision says the employee gets notice of the factors relied upon when the proposal is made – not the decision. So, if the DO agrees with the Douglas analysis in the proposal, there’s no need to add a word to the penalty assessment. Her decision letter will just say: “I have considered the penalty assessment factor analysis contained in the Proposal Letter, and I concur.” No new information, no due process violation.

If the DO disagrees is some way with the Douglas analysis in the proposal, or comes across new information that was not in the proposal or the employee’s response (let’s say she gets an email from a former coworker, discussing how the employee always cheated on his time cards when they worked together), the safest thing to do is to send the employee what we call a Ward letter, describe the new information that was considered, and give the employee a chance to respond to that new information.

If the case ends up on appeal before the MSPB, the Administrative Judge will certainly be more interested in what the DO has to say, than what the PO has to say. This does not mean the DO has to do a separate Douglas Factors analysis, though; it just means that the DO should be intimately familiar with the PO’s Douglas analysis and be prepared to answer any questions about the content therein, since she is signing off on the analysis and agreeing with it.

I hope you agree that in the Great Debate of 2020 (and 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016….all the way back to 1981), the clear winner is Douglas in the proposal notice. We’ve even helped agencies rewrite their discipline policies to reflect this legal requirement. Let us know if you want help with yours; we’d be happy to assist. [email protected]

By Deborah Hopkins, December 11, 2019

Last month, FELTG published an article about federal employees with hygiene issues, and whether agencies could justify taking disciplinary action against employees who do things like intentionally defecate themselves, urinate in closets, and bring in unwelcome critters on their clothing or hair, thus infesting the office.

As you can imagine, a lot of people clicked on that article. One of the cases cited dealt with a food inspector in a chicken processing plant who intentionally passed gas on and around his coworkers (Douglas v. USDA, AT-0752-06-0373-I-1 (2006)(ID)). I know a lot of people had a chuckle about that one, probably because it sounds horrid. (And it was horrid, among other things.) We used the case to illustrate the principle that employees can be disciplined for intentionally doing gross things in the workplace.

Some cases can teach us multiple lessons, and thanks to a FELTG reader who urged us to look deeper, I re-read the entire case – something I hadn’t done in a long time. I suggest you do the same and if you do, you will see this is not a case involving an employee playing the class clown, but it’s a case involving something much darker.

Yes, there is a lot about farting in the case – including multiple instances of the appellant passing gas and then asking coworkers and others if they could smell it. But the more serious issues in the case were incidents of unwelcome sexual conduct over an extended time period, against females he worked with and around. Some of the sexual references, suggestions, gestures, and requests are so egregious that I can’t print them here for fear of your agency firewalls blocking this email – not to mention the things he did with the chicken parts in an attempt to make his coworkers uncomfortable. In addition, the unwelcome sexual conduct was also directed at the private employees in the establishment that the appellant was charged with helping regulate, so it went beyond an internal agency issue. Despite multiple requests to stop, the appellant continued to subject his victims to this conduct. In the end, the AJ sustained the appellant’s 30-day suspension. This was 2006, and if you read the facts I think you’d agree that the agency could probably have justified a removal, even in a pre-#MeToo world.

Why do we bother spending so much time discussing an initial decision that doesn’t carry any precedential value? Because the principles are important, and the victims in this case are just as important as the victims in cases that carry precedential value. Our reader put it better than I ever could:

Often people laugh at those who say crude things to strangers on the street – dismissing them as silly because they won’t likely result in romance. I routinely cite this case to explain – saying overtly sexual things to someone is not meant to try and get them on a date. It’s meant to degrade the female with the overall purpose of elevating the male at her expense.

Why fart? Because it’s about POWER. Why would the same person who said explicit sexual things and ask for dates also raise his hip, [fart], ask “Didja smell that?” and laugh? Because he was engaged in multiple forms of bullying behavior. See the ID page 6 in particular…it’s just stunning (a great summation of a horrible thing).

This case is a perfect illustration that sexual harassment cases are not always about sexual desire. There are multiple motivators for unwelcome behavior in the workplace, and your agency should not put up with it. [email protected]

By Deborah Hopkins, December 11, 2019

‘Tis the season. Yes, the holidays are upon us and there are lights and ornaments and Christmas trees everywhere you look. But it’s also the season of snow, sleet, and ice in many parts of the country. And with that, it’s a good time to review OPM’s newish guidance on weather and safety leave, last updated in its Governmentwide Dismissal and Closure Procedures in November 2018 and based on the Administrative Leave Act of 2016.

FELTG readers understand the federal government’s vital business must continue without compromising the safety of its employees and the general public. And while some agencies can shut down for a day or two with no real harm, other agencies absolutely must stay operational no matter what’s happening outside.

Read the procedures for yourself here [PDF], but below are some highlights and reminders:

  • First, make sure you know your agency’s procedures about what is expected of you when operating status announcements are issued. Also, be sure you know where to look for operating status alerts. Is it the OPM website, your agency’s website, your local Federal Executive Board, your email, or somewhere else?
  • It’s also important to understand which flexibilities are available to you during specific agency operating procedures, such as unscheduled telework, unscheduled leave, leave without pay, an alternative day off, etc.
  • An agency may grant paid weather and safety leave when it is determined that employees cannot safely travel to or from, or safely perform work at their normal worksite, a telework site, or another approved location because of severe weather or another emergency situation. The cause could be weather, an earthquake, a terrorist attack, or any other situation that causes a danger to employees. There is no annual limit to paid weather and safety leave – it’s all up to Mother Nature.
  • Employees who are set up to telework are generally excluded from receiving weather and safety leave. Because this leave is explicitly granted when travel is dangerous, and employees who telework do not have to travel, they are expected to work as regularly scheduled. There are exceptions if, in the agency’s judgment, the telework-capable employee could not have reasonably anticipated the severe weather or other emergency condition and, therefore, did not take home needed equipment or work.But in general, telework-eligible employees are expected to anticipate telework days if the forecast makes weather-related leave likely
  • Employees on preapproved leave may not receive weather and safety leave even if their colleagues were granted the leave. That means if you used 40 hours of annual leave to escape the cold and go on a cruise, and that same week there is a snowstorm where you live and work and your colleagues get 16 hours of weather and safety leave because the roads are snowed in, you still have to use all 40 hours of annual leave. If you’re on leave, whether in or out of town, you don’t get the benefit of the snow days.

The new OPM Director also issued a memo with more highlights. Be safe out there! [email protected].

By Deborah Hopkins, December 3, 2019

My brother is several years younger than I am, and I remember when he was in kindergarten, his teacher recommended he go on Ritalin because he was hyper and she thought he had ADHD. My parents were taken aback and started talking to other parents who had children in my brother’s class. It turns out the teacher had recommended that 22 out of 25 of her students go on Ritalin.

I’m no medical expert, but I can tell you that 22 kids in his class did not have ADHD; they were five and six years old and had energy, as kids do. Maybe the teacher should have opted for a classroom of students who were a bit older, but I digress.

As we teach during the behavioral health day of Emerging Issues Week (next offered in Washington, DC, July 20-24), ADHD is a brain disorder with a pattern of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that interferes with functioning or development. This may include:

  • Inattention – individual wanders off task, lacks persistence, or has difficulty sustaining focus.
  • Hyperactivity – individual moves about constantly, excessively fidgets, taps, or talks. The individual is frequently restless.
  • Impulsivity – individual makes quick decisions without thinking through them first; may have a desire for immediate gratification and/or may be socially intrusive.

Note: These problems are not due to defiance, lack of comprehension or substance use.

I’m not sure if the over-diagnosis of ADHD in the 1980s and 1990s has led agencies to believe it is not a legitimate disability, but don’t make that mistake. ADHD does exist and for the people who have this condition, the symptoms and effects are very real.

If you’ve been in this business longer than five minutes, you are aware that Americans With Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the various amendments to these laws provide employment protections to certain people with disabilities.

In order to be covered the employee or applicant must:

–      Have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual,

–      Have a record of such an impairment, or

–      Be regarded as having such an impairment

42 USC § 12102(1).

Obvious physical impairments are sometimes handled better by agencies than mental impairments. Indeed, a number of mental impairments, such as ADHD, are what we refer to as “hidden,” “unseen,” or “invisible” disabilities. While it’s true that many physical disabilities are also invisible to the observer, there have been too many cases where agencies denied reasonable accommodation to employees with unseen mental impairments.

I’d like to look at two cases involving ADHD.

In the first, the complainant, who had ADHD, had a difficult time concentrating, so she requested to be moved to a quieter work area. Though the agency agreed the complainant had a disability, it took two years (!!!) before it addressed her request to move to a quieter, low-traffic area to work. She also requested she be allowed to do work that “focused on the task at hand,” be allowed to avoid multi-tasking whenever possible, and that the agency provide her with time to readjust when moving from one thing to another and time to formulate ideas when trying to streamline questions or statements. The agency did not grant these additional requests beyond the workspace move, and the complainant’s performance rating was affected as a result. The Commission found the agency did not show it would be an undue hardship to consider these requests and ordered the agency to expunge negative performance reviews from her file, and to consider the complainant’s claim for compensatory damages. Michelle G. v. Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 0120132463 (May 13, 2016).

In the second ADHD case, the complainant’s condition substantially limited her ability to concentrate. She also experienced side effects from multiple medications which further affected her ability to concentrate. Her request for accommodation included a medical note that stated, “cannot concentrate in loud open cubicle environment.” She requested a regular telework schedule, a private office or cubicle, or a modified work schedule. The agency requested additional information, which the complainant responded. Her medical documentation noted that the cubicle location allowed “for too many distractions for her disability” and that she “needed to work in the most distraction-free environment possible (e.g., a private office or quiet cubicle away from noise and/or distractions).” This did not satisfy the agency, so they asked for more. Once again, the complainant complied. Her doctor explained that she was: [H]aving difficulty wrapping up the final details of a project, organizing things, evidencing signs of physical and mental restlessness, easily distracted by noise, talking too much and interrupting people, and trouble waiting her turn, which Complainant’s doctor described as “classic signs of ADHD.” The complainant’s doctor added that medication “was not the full answer” and that “ADHD impact[ed] upon one’s ability to care for self, to speak appropriately, to interact with others, to concentrate and to work effectively.” The agency considered this medical documentation insufficient, so the complainant filed an EEO complaint over the denial of reasonable accommodation.

Eventually, the Commission found that the Agency failed to present sufficient evidence that granting the complainant’s request would have been an undue hardship, and the complainant received $60,000 in non-pecuniary damages, plus pecuniary damages and attorney’s fees. That’s an expensive lesson to learn. Selma D. v. Education, EEOC Appeal No. 0720150015 (April 22, 2016). [Allow me to note that the original RA request came in 2007 and the decision was not issued until 2016. Talk about harm.] So, there you have it.

If you want more, there’s still time to join FELTG’s webinar Accommodating Hidden Disabilities in the Workplace this Thursday. [email protected]

By Deborah Hopkins, November 13, 2019

You’ve probably all dealt with this situation at some point: You’re sitting on an airplane, bus, or subway train, or at a concert or in church or in a meeting, and you catch an odor from the person sitting next to you. It’s not a temporary odor that’s the result of an accidental gas release from an upset stomach. It’s a fixed odor that’s likely related to bad hygiene.

I remember one time flying on Southwest Airlines and being so grateful that the seats were not pre-assigned; a seatmate who had some very unpleasant odors settled in next to me and I was able to move without having to endure a 3-hour flight in that seat. With my overly sensitive sense of smell, I had to get out of there ASAP. While it might seem mean to say it’s difficult to be around people with bad odors, I’m not saying it to be mean. I think most readers would agree it can be a real challenge to be exposed to people with certain hygiene issues.

In many of these unpleasant situations, the arrangement is temporary, and in a number of cases you are able to remove yourself from the situation like I did on my flight. But what happens when the problem is coming from an employee or coworker who you have to see – and work around – every day?

Believe it or not, we have MSPB cases on the topic. A very old, foundational case addressed the matter of an employee who had unhygienic personal habits which went beyond body odor and included intentional defecation of himself in the workplace. The agency removed him on four charges including (1) non-compliance with work standard; and (4) unhygienic personal habits. The presiding official – who we now call the Administrative Judge – concluded that the appellant’s unhygienic personal habits alone would have been sufficient to remove him. Interestingly, the employee argued that his disability (colitis) caused the misconduct, the MSPB didn’t buy that argument and agreed with the presiding official:

The evidence of record plainly shows the demoralizing and unhealthy environment created by appellant’s personal habits. The record also reflects that the agency frequently counseled appellant as to his hygiene and that appellant made no effort to change. The agency endured appellant’s poor performance and unhygienic habits for many years. It need not exercise forbearance indefinitely. Gertzman v. INS, 9 MSPR 581, 583 (Jan. 19, 1982).

It’s true that sometimes body odor is disability-related, and you may need to consider an accommodation. However, that was not the case in Gertzman.

In another old case, the agency removed a probationer for failure to improve her personal hygiene after repeated warnings and counseling from her supervisors and after several complaints about her odor from her coworkers and members of her trade. As many of our readers know, if a probationer is removed, she has very limited appeal rights to MSPB and may only appeal if her removal was based on partisan political reasons or marital status. 5 USC 7511(a)(1)(A)(i); Ney v. Commerce, 115 MSPR 204 (2010). In this case, the appellant claimed she had hygiene and odor issues because her status as an unmarried person prevented her from obtaining resources that would allow her to improve her personal hygiene. The MSPB didn’t buy that argument, either, but you can’t blame a person for trying. Hilden v. USDA, 8 MSPR 300 (Oct. 1, 1981).

I’ve got more. There’s the Bureau of Prisons supervisor who for years urinated in a mop closet – not into a bucket but onto the closet floor – rather than walk to the restroom to use the proper facilities. As if that’s not bad enough, he also encouraged his subordinate to do the same. His demotion for Conduct Unbecoming a Supervisor was upheld. Hutchinson v. DOJ, 211 MSPR 77 (May 5, 2014). Then there’s the food inspector who was suspended for “improper conduct” because he intentionally passed gas around his coworkers on the food inspection line, and then asked them to smell it. Douglas v. USDA, AT-0752-06-0373-I-1 (2006)(ID).

What about the employees who bring critters in to the office with them? No, not emotional support animals (that’s a different article) but things like bedbugs. Can you tell the employee they are prohibited from bringing bedbugs in to the office? Well, sure. As long as you have a business-based reason, you can set a workplace rule for an employee, and there is most certainly a business-based reason for not wanting bedbugs in a federal office. Tell the employee, then follow up in an email: “Do not bring bedbugs to the office.” If necessary, you can even do an indefinite suspension until the employee demonstrates medically she is free of the little critters. See, e.g., Pittman v. MSPB, 832 F.2d 598 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Moe v. Navy, 2013 MSPB 43 (June 14, 2013), cases which don’t deal with bedbugs but say that an agency can indefinitely suspend an employee, pending inquiry, for psychological or other medical reasons if the agency has a sufficient objective basis for doing so. We never have to tolerate unsafe or, for lack of a better term, unhygienic, conduct in the workplace. [email protected]

By Deborah Hopkins, November 13, 2019

It’s that time of year again. No, not the time when the stores put out Christmas decorations and pre-black-Friday sales begin (although that is happening, too). It’s the release of OPM’s 2019 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS). Each year as I await the report, I wonder what new pieces of information we’ll learn about how the federal government is doing as an employer. And each year, I learn something I didn’t know before. In case you haven’t had a chance to read it, here are a few takeaways, in ascending percentage order, from over 615,000 federal employees who participated:

  • 17% of respondents said there were no poor performers in their work unit.
  • 34% believe their supervisors take steps to deal with a poor performer who cannot or will not improve. Looking at it from the other side, this means that 66% of employees still don’t think supervisors are taking action against poor performers. Not a great number, but it is still the best percentage on this question in recent memory.
  • 39% believe that differences in performance among employees in their work unit are recognized in a meaningful way. Again, this means that 61% do not feel recognized.
  • 56% said that poor performers remain in their work unit and continue to underperform.
  • 57% believe their training needs were assessed and addressed in the past year.
  • 59% think their workload is reasonable.
  • 66% would recommend their organization as a good place to work.
  • 67% believe they can disclose a suspected violation of any law, rule or regulation without fear of reprisal – in other words, two-thirds of employees believe it’s safe to be a whistleblower in the federal government.
  • 71% of respondents agree with their most recent performance rating.
  • 83% believe their supervisors are holding them accountable for performance.
  • And, and astounding 96% of employees who responded said that when needed they are willing to put in the extra effort to get a job done. This proves what FELTG has always known, that most of our readers are incredible, hard-working, dedicated employees who want to make the government a better place.

There’s also an entire series of questions related to the impact of the 35-day shutdown, which is not very eye-opening but because it’s new you might find it interesting. If you want to read it yourself, check it out here [PDF]. [email protected]

By Deborah Hopkins, October 16, 2019

What if…

  • You could discipline an employee in a way that didn’t cause you more work?
  • You could discipline an employee and they couldn’t file a grievance or complaint?
  • The discipline you issued actually helped other people?

Believe it or not, there’s a way to make all these dreams come true. You see, in addition to traditional discipline (reprimand, suspension, demotion, and removal), the MSPB, for years, has blessed alternative arrangements that agencies and employees agree to, that carry the weight of traditional discipline but are not traditional disciplinary actions. These are called discipline alternatives.

As former MSPB Chairman Neil McPhie once put it, “The merit principles encourage agencies to be effective and efficient in how they use the Federal workforce. This includes the responsibility to address misconduct in a manner that has the greatest potential to prevent further harm to the efficiency of the service. Under the correct circumstances, alternative discipline may be the most effective method for addressing such misconduct.” (Emphasis added.)

One of the most popular discipline alternatives is the Reprimand in Lieu of a Suspension (RLS). We first learned about these courtesy of the United States Postal Service, which back in the 1990s negotiated suspensions OUT of their master contract and replaced them with RLS.

That’s right, forget about suspensions because there’s no evidence they work anyway. In fact, when you suspend an employee for misconduct, the supervisor and co-workers have to pick up the slack while the suspended employee sits at home doing nothing.

Here’s how an RLS works. If a supervisor determines that an employee deserves to be suspended, let’s say for 5 days, the supervisor proposes the 5-day suspension. But at the bottom of the proposal letter there’s an additional section with an employee signature line, that read something like this:

By my signature below, I accept responsibility for this act of misconduct. I acknowledge that discipline is warranted and accept a Reprimand in Lieu of a Suspension as offered to me by My Manager. I understand that the agency will consider this Reprimand in Lieu of a Suspension as equivalent to the proposed suspension for the purpose of progressive discipline should I engage in future misconduct. By accepting this Reprimand in Lieu of a Suspension I agree not to file a complaint or grievance about this action.

Pretty cool, huh?

There are other alternatives you might want to consider as well. Here are a few, in no particular order.

  • Paper suspension or weekend suspension: With this approach, there is no loss of pay, but the agreement is considered to carry the weight of a suspension.
  • Non-sequential suspension: Instead of a 5-day suspension where an employee loses half a paycheck, suspend the employee one day per week for 5 weeks.
  • Leave donation: The employee donates annual leave to a leave bank or leave transfer program. For example, if the proposed suspension was 3 days, the employee donates 3 days of annual leave.
  • Community service: This may be a hard one to enforce, but the employee may agree to perform 24 hours of community service instead of a 3-day suspension.
  • LWOP: Carry the employee on LWOP for the amount of time the agency would have suspended him. Because it is coded as LWOP instead of a suspension, there will be no permanent record of a disciplinary action.
  • Training or support services: Require the employee to attend training or go to EAP in lieu of a suspension, if the type of misconduct matches up with these options.
  • Last chance agreement: Hold the penalty in abeyance for two years. If the employee does not engage in misconduct during the two years the proposal goes away, but if the employee violates another workplace rule during those two years, the penalty immediately goes into effect.

Remember, in each of these cases you are cutting a deal with the employee and offering the discipline alternative in exchange for the employee waiving her right to appeal or file a complaint about this discipline. If you don’t like it, then forget about it because you don’t have to do it. But I promise, these discipline alternatives will make your life much easier. [email protected]

By Deborah Hopkins, October 16, 2019

A question recently came up in class about the difference between an initial-appointment probationary period and a supervisory probationary period in the competitive service. It turned into a more interesting discussion that I would have guessed, so I thought perhaps some FELTG readers might also be intrigued. Here goes.

Initial-Appointment Probationary Period

When an individual gets her first job with the federal government, she begins a one-year probationary period with that initial appointment (some jobs are subject to a two-year trial period). During this time, the employee is expected to perform the work at an acceptable level, and to follow workplace rules. If, during the probationary period, there is a problem with the probationer’s performance, the agency can remove the employee without putting her on a performance demonstration period. If the employee is engaging in misconduct, the agency can remove her for a first offense without utilizing progressive discipline, even if the misconduct is minor. In fact, a removal doesn’t have to be related to performance or misconduct, if the agency determines it is not a good fit, or the agency no longer needs the probationer’s service.  In addition, the probationer has very limited appeal rights and generally cannot appeal her removal to MSPB. (There are a few exceptions: If she claims she was removed because of her marital status, or because of her partisan political activity, or for pre-appointment reasons (5 CFR 315.805), she can appeal to the MSPB. Otherwise, the Board has no jurisdiction.) A probationer does have a right to file an EEO or OSC complaint.

The reason a probationer’s MSPB appeal rights are limited is because until the probationary period is successfully completed, the employee has not earned a property interest in her job, and, therefore, she is not entitled to the constitutional due process afforded to vested career employees (advance notice, opportunity to respond, impartial decision). Most employees are on their best behavior when they start a new job. If, in the first 12 months of employment, it becomes apparent the person is already not a good fit, the agency should remove that person before the statutory protections attach.

The probationary period applies to initial appointments with the federal government as a whole, so an employee new to your agency may have already completed a probationary period, or part of a probationary period, at another agency.

Timing is important here so if you’re thinking about removing an employee who is new to your organization, check the calendar to determine whether you can remove them without due process procedures.

Supervisory Probationary Period

Now let’s talk about new supervisors and managers, and their probationary periods, 5 U.S.C. 3321. But first some definitions. According to MSPB’s research brief Improving Federal Leadership Through Better Probationary Practices (May 2019):

A supervisor is someone who accomplishes work through the direction of other people and performs at least the minimum supervisory duties required for coverage under the OPM General Schedule Supervisory Guide. They plan work, communicate organizational goals and policies, guide performance, listen to concerns and ideas, ensure employees have the resources needed to do their jobs, play a significant role in determining the culture of the organization, and often make difficult decisions about employee recruitment, retention, development, recognition, and appraisal. In addition, because resources are scarce for many employers, supervisors are often expected to perform line work that requires technical skills.

A manager supervises other supervisors and is not a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES). Further, a manager, as described in the General Schedule Supervisory Guide, directs the work of an organizational unit, is held accountable for the success of specific line or staff functions, monitors and evaluates the progress of the organization toward meeting goals, and makes adjustments in objectives, work plans, schedules, and commitment of resources.

Because the roles of supervising and managing people are of the utmost importance in agencies achieving mission success, an additional probationary period attaches when an employee first becomes a supervisor or manager. These probationary periods are governed by different regulations than the initial-appointment probationary periods. While there is no statutory timeline, most agencies set this period to a year.

Interestingly, agencies also require managers to complete a managerial probationary period once they begin their first manager job, even if they have already completed a supervisory probationary period.

So, at the end of this probationary period, how does an agency determine if a supervisor or manager has been successful? The regulations allow agencies a lot of flexibility in making this determination before the supervisory appointment is finalized. Some lay out the expectations explicitly while others leave a lot of judgment up to the next-in-command.

Let’s say the supervisory probationary period doesn’t go well and the agency determines the employee is not an effective supervisor. What happens now? Well, just because someone isn’t a good supervisor doesn’t mean that person isn’t a good employee. Results from MSPB’s Governmentwide 2016 Merit Principles Survey show that 72 percent of employees believe that their supervisor had good technical skills, but only 62 percent believed their supervisor had good people-management skills. Interestingly, though, in 2016 there were 28,467 new supervisors but agencies only took action in 192 of those cases – about .67%.

Being an unsuccessful leader does not automatically mean a probationary supervisor is out of a job at the end of the year. As long as that person has successfully completed the initial-appointment probationary period through prior federal service, she will be reassigned to a non-supervisory position in the agency at the same grade-level and pay she was earning before she became a supervisor. A removal from service without due process violates the employee’s statutory protections. If, however, the supervisor or manager was not in the competitive service before beginning her supervisory probationary period, then she is also concurrently serving her initial-appointment probationary period and has no right to a non-supervisory job, so she can be removed from service without due process. [email protected]

Related training: 

By Deborah Hopkins and William Wiley, October 8, 2019

We’ve been reading and hearing a lot lately about whistleblowers, most recently about the Ukraine/Biden/Trump situation. We’re not here to discuss the merits of the complaint about President Trump’s conversation with Ukrainian President Zelensky, and we’re not here to discuss politics. We’re here to clarify that the media and numerous folks in Washington have (yet again) gotten a lot of things wrong in talking about this mysterious intelligence community whistleblower.

In discussions about the whistleblower’s motive for making the disclosure, one of the themes that keeps coming out is, “The whistleblower is a partisan.” Well, guess what? Even if that’s true, it’s irrelevant because when it comes to whistleblowing, the motive does not matter.

That’s right, whether a whistleblower makes the public aware of waste, fraud and abuse because he wants to save the world, or whether he does it to get the President impeached, the law protects him anyway, as long as he meets the legal requirements of whistleblowing.

To be protected a whistleblower must disclose:

  • Violation of law, rule, or regulation;
  • Gross mismanagement or gross waste of funds;
  • Substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; or
  • Abuse of authority.

While there is statutory protection and a Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-19) that covers whistleblowing by intelligence community employees, the Whistleblower Protection Act and the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act cover a large group of employees in the federal sector non-intelligence communities. That’s what we’ll discuss here today, because these are the statutes that apply to most FELTG readers.  [Editor’s note: House Democrats Ted Lieu (Calif.) and Don Beyer (Va.) recently updated and released a whistleblower guide for federal employees that you may find of interest.]

Let’s start with a little history lesson. Following the implementation of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), a whistleblower’s disclosures were not considered protected if the employee’s “primary motivation” was not for the public good, but rather for was for his own personal motives. See Fiorillo v. Department of Justice, 795 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1986). However, in subsequent years, the Federal Circuit determined it had improperly reached that conclusion because nothing in the CSRA requires an employee’s motives should be considered in determining whether a disclosure is protected. Id.; see also Horton v. Department of the Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 282-283 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

In 1988, Congress decided that a whistleblower’s motivation should not be considered, and that all employees should be encouraged to alert the public of waste, fraud and abuse. “The [Office of Special Counsel], the Board and the courts should not erect barriers to disclosures which will limit the necessary flow of information from employees who have knowledge of government wrongdoing.” S. Rep. No. 413, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1988). Id.

As we said above, under 5 USC § 2302(b)(8), disclosures of information that the employee making the disclosures “reasonably believes” evidences certain kinds of wrongdoing are protected. The only time bias or motivation might enter the picture is in testing reasonableness of belief in blowing the whistle — and, warning, it’s an uphill battle. While bias and self-interest may be considered in testing the reasonableness of belief, bias alone does not determine that a whistleblower does not have a reasonable belief. LaChance v. White, 174 F.3d at 1381. Personal motivation, whether to save the world, ruin someone’s career, or something in between, does not per se affect reasonableness. Carter v. Army, 62 MSPR 393 (1994).

If “the employee is motivated by a desire to damage others’ reputations,” this fact alone is not dispositive, even though the whistleblower’s motives in making disclosures were to destroy his supervisor “during the course of an internal agency power struggle,” Fickie v. Army, 86 MSPR 525 (2000).

Separately, some in the press made a big issue that the whistleblower disclosed no first-hand information in the complaint, nor any other direct proof of the alleged impropriety that occurred in the President’s July 25 phone call. Again, that’s irrelevant as to whether the individual is a protected whistleblower. A whistleblower need only have a “reasonable belief” in the facts he is disclosing, not actual proof that the facts are as they are being described. In other words, if an individual is told something by a reliable source, and chooses to believe it because it makes sense to him, he is then protected if he discloses the believed facts in a whistleblower complaint. It’s the subsequent investigation of the complaint that is supposed to flesh out the facts based on credible evidence; it’s not up to the whistleblower to prove the allegations.

Some talking heads made an issue out of the belief that the employee is not a whistleblower because the alleged facts do not rise to the level of a crime. Well, federal employees are whistleblowers if they report things other than criminal activity; e.g., a simple abuse of authority or gross mismanagement will suffice to protect the discloser. The commission of a “high crime or misdemeanor” would be relevant to the impeachment process, but not to the status of being a whistleblower.

A lot of guests on talk TV have used harsh words to describe the whistleblower: traitor, spy, partisan hack, deep-state operative, rotten snitch, rat, back stabber, saboteur. In reality, a federal employee who believes that he or she has observed corruption committed by a government official is required by regulation to disclose that belief. A “basic obligation of public service” can be found at 5 CFR Sec. 2635.101

(a) Public service is a public trust. … To ensure that every citizen can have complete confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, each employee shall respect and adhere to the principles of ethical conduct set forth in this section …

(b) …

(11) Employees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities.

Even if the individual personally did not want to disclose what appeared to be corruption being committed by a particular government official, the regulations mandates that a disclosure be made.

What does this all mean? It means Congress has afforded protections to whistleblowers higher than any other kind of protection in the civil service, and as long as the employee has a reasonable belief that the content of the protected disclosure is true, that whistleblower cannot legally be disciplined for making the disclosure – even if his goal was to make his boss look bad, get fired, or worse.

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