Is Three-strikes Progressive Discipline a Thing of the Past?

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By Deborah J. Hopkins, March 15, 2023

A recent MSPB nonprecedential decision has me scratching my head, as the outcome appears to go against over 40 years of case precedent. I wrote about the facts of the case in a previous newsletter article, so if you’d like the specific details please check that out. A quick recap though: The agency removed an employee based on three charges: (1) lack of candor; (2) disregard of directive; and (3) unauthorized absence. The MSPB only sustained charge 2, disregard of directive, because the appellant did not follow appropriate leave request procedures.

Because the agency only proved one of three charges, the Board mitigated the removal to a 7-day suspension. That may not sound odd to you, but here’s where I’m stuck: if you look at Board’s view of the Douglas factors analysis on pages 9-10 in the case [PDF], the appellant “was previously reprimanded and served a 3-day suspension for failure to follow the agency’s leave procedures.”

A principle that has been around for longer than the Civil Service Reform Act, progressive discipline stands for the proposition that for minor misconduct, Federal employees are generally given a “three strikes and you’re out” opportunity to learn from conduct-based mistakes. Progressive discipline, which we’ll discuss in more detail during MSPB Law Week March 27-31, typically looks like this:

  • First offense of misconduct: Reprimand
  • Second offense of misconduct: Suspension of 1-14 calendar days
  • Third offense of misconduct: Removal

Progressive discipline is not mandatory, most recently confirmed during OPM’s discussion of its updated regulations at 5 CFR §752.202.

There are times agencies remove an employee for a first offense (see, e.g., Pinegar v. FEC, 2007 MSPB 140), and there are times they give more than three strikes – sometimes a lot more (see, e.g., Blank v. Army, 85 MSPR 443 (2000)). And that is absolutely up to the agency. But past discipline has almost always been a significant aggravating factor, and for over four decades the Board has generally upheld removals for a third offense of any misconduct. See, e.g., Grubb v. DOI, 96 MSPR 361 (2004).

If the Board were to follow its own precedent in the current case, the agency should have received penalty deference and the Board should have upheld the removal. Instead, the Board found other factors to be mitigating:

  • The appellant worked for the agency for six years and did not have any performance problems during that time.
  • The appellant was not a supervisor.
  • The appellant contacted the agency “to inform his supervisor that he would be absent, albeit not in the way in which he was instructed.”
  • The appellant claimed he and his wife were having relationship troubles.
  • The appellant claimed he was experiencing pain because of a disability.
  • The agency’s table of penalties recommended a “5-day suspension to removal for a third offense of failure to request leave according to established procedures.”

If removal was appropriate according to the table of penalties, why did the Board mitigate?

I will admit, proving only one specification of one charge does make one consider whether the penalty is unreasonable; in essence the agency only proved a third of its case. That said, because of the weight past discipline usually holds, I am a little surprised the Board did not defer to the agency’s penalty. I wonder if the outcome would have been different if there was language in the decision letter that any charge standing alone would warrant removal? See, e.g., Sheiman v. Treasury, SF-0752-15-0372-I-2 (May 24, 2022)(NP).

This is one of the few cases under this Board where a Member dissented from the majority; Tristan Leavitt noted a dissent but without opinion, so it’s anyone’s guess as to why. Perhaps it’s for the very reason outlined above. Ortiz v. USAF, DE-0752-22-0062-I-1 (Jan. 25, 2023)(NP).

At first I was thinking this might be an outlier, but two subsequent cases have seen the same mitigation despite of past progressive discipline: Spivey v. Treasury (IRS), CH-0752-16-0318-I-1 (Feb. 15, 2023 )(NP) [PDF] and Williams v. HHS, DC-0752-16-0558-I-1 (Feb. 25, 2023)(NP) [PDF]. Read on for Bill Wiley’s take on these cases and on why agencies discipline at all. [email protected]

Why, Oh Why, Do You Ever Discipline a Federal Employee?

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By William Wiley, March 15, 2023

So you just read FELTG President Deb Hopkins’ article about Ortiz v. Air Force, DE-0752-22-0062-I-1 (Jan. 25, 2023) (NP). [PDF] The decision is significant only because it is very unusual (some might say “weird”) for the Board to impose a second suspension after a misbehaving employee has already been reprimanded and suspended without his learning to obey agency rules.

Another recent decision raised this same issue. The Board mitigated a removal to a 10-day suspension even though the agency had previously suspended the employee for five days for the same type of misconduct. Spivey v. Treasury (IRS), CH-0752-16-0318-I-1 (Feb. 15, 2023) (NP). [PDF] Similar to Ortiz, one of the charges brought by the agency in Spivey failed on appeal and the agency “never stated that it desired that a lesser penalty be imposed if only one of the two charges was sustained.” By not stating in the decision memorandum what the penalty would be if fewer than all the charges were sustained, if one or more charges is not sustained on appeal, the deciding official, thereby, allows the Board to independently assess the Douglas Factors and select a penalty. See LaChance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

This second-suspension mitigation highlights one of the great unanswered existential questions about the Federal workplace: Why do agencies discipline misbehaving employees? Suspending an employee for misconduct requires the agency to expend significant resources:

  • What happens to the employee’s work assignments during the suspension? Are they reassigned to hardworking coworkers who have to bear that extra burden? Must the supervisor bring in an outside contractor to do the work? Or does the employee’s work simply not get done during the duration of the suspension?
  • Separate from devoting resources to the suspended employee’s workload, there’s the cost of defending the disciplinary action. Career Federal employees have a plethora of ways to challenge a disciplinary action: administrative grievances, union grievances, EEO complaints, complaints to the US Office of Special Counsel, complaints to the Department of Labor related to veterans’ USERRA rights, MSPB appeals if the discipline is significant, etc.

Given that there can be a considerable cost to an agency when it suspends an employee, and given that an agency usually doesn’t expend resources without some gain in return, what is the benefit that the agency hopes to attain in exchange for a misconduct suspension? Two possibilities come to mind:

  • The agency hopes to motivate the employee to obey workplace rules. Behavioral psychologists call this technique for controlling behavior “negative reinforcement.” The theory is that by suffering pain (physical, mental, financial), the individual will learn to avoid that same pain in the future by refraining from engaging in the behavior that resulted in the pain. Cats sit on a hot stove only once. A child may learn acceptable social behavior as a result of the pain of isolation by being told to sit in a corner. In theory, a Federal employee deprived of part of a paycheck by a suspension will refrain from engaging in the misconduct that resulted in the monetary loss. It’s fair to say that the primary reason agencies suspend employees is to “correct behavior.”
  • Is there some element of just plain old retribution in workplace discipline? An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. You stepped on my foot; I’m going to stomp on yours. You caused me to suffer (by breaking a workplace rule), I’m going to make you suffer (by suspending you without pay) in retribution. Frankly, I would hope that this punishment-for-the-sake-of-punishment, separate from a desire to correct behavior, is not a desired “benefit” for an agency when it suspends an employee. However, when I look at how agencies have handled disciplining employees over the years, and how MSPB has validated those actions, I’m left with a belief that there is something beyond correcting behavior that motivates agencies to suspend.

If we accept that the primary objective of an agency suspending an employee is to correct behavior, then the Board’s mitigation to a second suspension in Ortiz raises a series of fundamental questions:

  • If the agency’s initial suspension of three days did not motivate the employee to abide by workplace rules, what makes the Board think that a second suspension of seven days will teach the employee that breaking rules is to be avoided? In practice, a seven-day suspension is only five workdays, two workdays of lost pay more than the initial three-day suspension. Is the Board thinking that those extra two days of lost pay will cause the employee to begin to obey the agency’s rules even though the first suspension did not?
  • How long should an agency have to tolerate a disobedient employee in its workforce? If these extra two days of lost pay do not result in the employee becoming obedient to the agency’s rules, is MSPB suggesting that another incident of this employee disregarding a directive should result in a suspension of an additional two or three more workdays of pay? What evidence is there that incrementally increasing the length of a suspension might eventually get the employee to obey the agency’s rules?

Perhaps the agency could have done more to protect itself from a mitigation. Not only did the deciding official not testify as to the penalty that would have been imposed if only one of the three charges had been sustained, but the agency’s own table of penalties indicates that a suspension is within the range of appropriate penalties for a third offense — “five-day suspension to removal.”

In Spivery, the table of penalties also allows for a suspension for a third offense. Effectively, agencies that have suspensions within the range for a third offense in their penalty table are acknowledging that a Federal employee who violates workplace rules may remain a Federal employee indefinitely.

There is a significant philosophical question in all of this, one that has not clearly been addressed. Why should agencies discipline employees? I would offer three plausible reasons and encourage agencies to adopt one, then clearly incorporate that into agency discipline policies:

  1. Suspensions are intended to correct behavior. If this is the agency’s objective, then the discipline policy should state it clearly. If the agency uses a table of penalties, then it should incorporate the three-strikes rule for guidance: reprimand, suspend, then removal. If a single suspension does not correct the employee’s behavior, there’s no evidence that a second or third suspension will.
  2. Suspensions are intended to punish. If this is the agency’s objective, then the discipline policy should leave room for more than one suspension, state in what situations more than one suspension would be reasonable, and then be prepared to have any removal mitigated to another suspension. The agency also should be prepared to continue the employment of individuals who repeatedly do not obey workplace rules and expend the resources necessary to do that.
  3. Suspensions have no place in a modern Federal workplace. This is the philosophical position adopted by a number of private sector companies. It is based on the belief that in a mature workforce, employers should not have to inflict pain on employees to get them to obey rules (and the employer should not have to bear the expense and inconvenience of a suspension).

Here’s one way the third option works. The first time an employee engages in misconduct, the supervisor tells the employee in writing that he has violated a workplace rule and that he should adhere to all rules in the future. This notice would be analogous to a reprimand in the Federal system. After notification, if the employee again violates a rule, the supervisor informs the employee of the rule violation and sends the employee home with pay for a day to contemplate whether he is willing to adhere to the company’s rules. If after this opportunity for contemplation the employee again violates a workplace rule, the supervisor offers the employee the opportunity to resign. If he refuses, the supervisor fires the employee. No punishment of the employee, no suspension-harm caused to the employer. Just the civil no-fault resolution of an inability to correct behavior situation.

Our civilization has evolved beyond the indentured servitude and physical bondage of earlier generations of our work forces. We no longer publicly flog or use a pillory with indentured servants who do not work hard enough. We are no longer in the early days of the last century when blue collar employees were seen as a lower class of citizen, beholden to and under the absolute control of their upper-class employers. The modern workplace is an egalitarian organization of knowledge workers with many flexibilities and employment options that were unheard of just a few decades ago.

Our Federal civil servants are getting older. Over the next few years, we can expect a large number of retirements from government service, with those senior citizens being replaced by younger workers who expect to be treated with respect as human beings rather than being forced and coerced into performing their jobs.

Perhaps, it is time for our management approach in the Federal government to evolve beyond discipling and punishing by suspending misbehaving employees, and instead focus on filling the civil service with individuals who follow directives without the need for pain. [email protected]

Join FELTG for MSPB Law Week:

When Settlement Agreements Fall Apart: Leave Issues

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By Barbara Haga, March 13, 2023

I enjoyed putting together the columns on clean record agreements so much that I thought we should follow that thread. This month, we look at things agreed to in settlement agreements that were ruled to be illegal and resulted in the MSPB overturning the settlement. These types of provisions fall in the “mutual mistake” category. Sometimes, there is a lot more to these agreements than back pay and attorney fees. This time we are going to look at leave issues.

Crediting Leave. In Franchesca V. v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120170632 (Mar. 2017), the complainant filed an age discrimination and reprisal claim.  She retired while the complaint was being processed. A settlement agreement was ultimately executed to resolve the complaint. The agreement said, among other things: “The Agency will, within 60 days of execution of this Agreement initiate restoration of the necessary amount of sick leave (approximately 606 hours) so Complainant retires with a balance of one year [in addition to her other years of service].”

The agency immediately ran into problems executing this portion of the agreement. The payroll office (DFAS, outside of VA) said it was a violation to grant this amount of leave under these circumstances. The agency’s servicing HR office intervened. Finally, the payroll office processed it and submitted the corrected record to OPM.

This lengthy process resulted in the complainant alleging a breach of the agreement, which escalated the matter to the agency HQ. They requested review of the matter, which included the following:

Complainant retired with 29 years and 4 months in service. The OGC staff attorney wrote that the intent of the sick leave restoration provision was to round up Complainant’s service to the next full year for retirement purposes. She wrote that when she negotiated the settlement agreement, she did not know this type of provision was frowned upon and considered an inappropriate use of retirement benefits. The OGC staff attorney wrote that DFAS made it clear that since Complainant never used 606 hours of sick leave, the Agency was asking to credit her more sick leave than she earned, which was not possible. Referring to the settlement negotiations, she wrote that she thought everyone assumed that Complainant would have spoken up if the Agency was offering the “restoration” of leave she never took.

After reviewing the information and consulting with the Department of Justice, the VA’s benefits and leave administration expert determined the provision was not just frowned upon but a violation of the law. The agency could not credit sick leave in excess of what the employee would have earned during her career.

Administrative Leave. In McDavid v. Army, 46 MSPR 108 (MSPB 1990), the appellant was found to be medically disqualified from flying. He was removed from his supervisory pilot position effective July 23, 1987.  McDavid appealed the removal, and it was settled on Nov. 3, 1987. One of the settlement provisions stated the agency agreed to pay him his salary from the date of the agreement until his retirement on Sept. 30, 1988, meaning roughly ten months of administrative leave would be granted.

Here’s what the Board had to say when it reviewed the enforcement action:

In Miller v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. DE07528810290 (MSPB 1990), the Board set aside a settlement agreement on the basis of mutual mistake on which the parties relied in reaching the agreement. In Miller, the parties had entered into an agreement in settlement of the appellant’s appeal from his removal. The agreement provided, among other things, that the appellant would be placed on administrative leave for one year and would thereafter resign. The Board sought an advisory opinion from the Comptroller General, who found that the administrative leave was unlawful. While not bound by the Comptroller General’s opinion, see Apple v. Department of Transportation, MSPB DE07528/C0653-1 (Sept. 14, 1988), the Board found persuasive the Comptroller General’s conclusion that, except for brief absences, unless there is specific statutory authority, the agency could not expend appropriated funds where it received no benefit in return. See Miller, slip op. at 7-8. The Board noted that the Comptroller General advised that the provision granting administrative leave was not in furtherance of the agency’s mission, because the agency had no authority to provide such benefits, even though it was granted in an agreement in settlement of a personnel action. See Id. at 8. Finding that the unlawful provision was central to the agreement, and numerous other provisions were dependent upon it, the Board set aside the agreement.

In today’s world, OPM would be answering compensation and leave claims not covered by negotiated grievance procedures, since responsibility for these matters was moved from GAO to OMB, who in turn delegated the responsibility for adjudication to OPM in 1996.  Given what we know about OPM’s posture on use of administrative leave in conjunction with disciplinary and performance actions as included in their current guidance, as well as the limitations on administrative leave that OPM included in the not-yet-finalized administrative leave regulations issued in July 2017, I would expect OPM would answer the same way today.

Unspecified Amount of LWOP. The settlement agreement in Garcia v. Air Force, 83 MSPR 277 (MSPB 1999), stated that Garcia would be carried in an LWOP status from the date of execution of the settlement agreement until the date he became eligible to retire from Federal service. That’s all it said. There was nothing about the type of retirement or what else the agency might do in relation to the retirement.

The problem was that at the time of the agreement, Garcia was not even close to being eligible to retire optionally. He was 45 years old with almost 25 years of service. Optional retirement would have required a minimum of 55 years of age with 30 years of service. Was the agency agreeing to 10 years of LWOP? (Of course, all that LWOP would have meant Garcia wouldn’t have been eligible to retire then either.)  Or was it as Garcia argued?  That he would be kept in LWOP for six months until he had 25 years or service and reached eligibility for discontinued service retirement – and then the agency would abolish his position?

The agency representative stated he had believed that the appellant would qualify for regular retirement at the end of six months. Unfortunately, that was not the case. The Board set aside the agreement.

Good News: Prompt Harassment Investigation Can Limit Liability

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By Ann Boehm, March 13, 2023

I frequently get asked, “Should the agency conduct a harassment misconduct investigation even if there is a pending EEO complaint filed by the alleged victim?” The answer is a resounding “YES!”

I should be surprised by this question, but I am not. I worked in agencies reluctant to investigate a harassment allegation for fear it could adversely impact on an EEO matter if the investigation uncovered harassment. The problem with that thinking is it does not comport with how liability is determined in a hostile work environment harassment case.

Let’s review some U.S. Supreme Court case law on harassment. In the landmark sexual harassment case Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Court explained that an employer can avoid liability for sexual harassment by a supervisor if the alleged harassing actions did not occur, the alleged acts were not “unwelcome,” the alleged harassment was not so “severe or pervasive” that it altered the alleged victim’s terms and conditions of employment, the employer took immediate and appropriate corrective action once it learned about the alleged harassment, and there was no basis for liability under agency principles. Id. at 67; see also Dollie T. v. Perdue, Sec’y of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 2019003298 (Sept. 21, 2020).

In 1998, the Supreme Court provided more guidance on employer liability in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). These decisions explained that an employer is always liable for harassment that results in a tangible employment action. A tangible employment action harassment case arises when a supervisor undertakes, recommends, or threatens a tangible employment action based on a subordinate’s response to unwelcome sexual demands. Examples include a failure to hire or promote; undesirable reassignment; disciplinary action; or any decision causing a significant change in benefits.

If, however, there is no tangible employment action and the allegation involves a hostile work environment, employer liability is not a certainty. An employer can avoid or limit liability in a hostile work environment case by showing it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,” and that the complainant unreasonably failed to take advantage of “any preventive or corrective opportunities provide by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 745.

What does an agency need to do to exercise reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any harassing behavior? Along with having a policy that provides an avenue for employees to complain about harassment without fear of retaliation, the agency must have “a complaint process that provides a prompt, thorough and impartial investigation” and “assurance that the employer will take immediate an appropriate corrective action when it determined harassment has occurred.” Dollie T., EEOC Appeal No. 2019003298, at 14.

Simple, right? Promptly investigate a hostile work environment allegation and you are on the way to avoiding agency liability, even if the EEO process reveals there was indeed a hostile work environment. Of course, if the misconduct investigation also uncovers a hostile work environment, corrective action – typically removing the offending employee(s) from the workplace and often disciplining them – must also occur for the agency to avoid liability.

One more important aspect of this liability avoidance centers on the word “prompt.” The EEOC takes that word very seriously. In the Dollie T. case, the agency took three months to initiate the investigation. The EEOC said “[t]he Agency simply took too long and did not address this matter in a sufficiently prompt manner.” Id., at 15.

Ouch!

In my many years of government experience, getting something done in the government in three months is quick as lightning. Not so in the hostile work environment world. Prompt means really prompt!

What is really prompt? The agency avoided liability in Thornton v. Mike Johans, Secretary of Agriculture by implementing its process for addressing reported harassment “the day it was reported,” and initiating an investigation that resulted in a report being issued 54 days after the agency learned about the alleged hostile work environment. EEOC Appeal No. 01A60388 (Sept. 28, 2006).

Investigating promptly and taking effective corrective action can result in no liability for the agency. Completing an investigation in 54 days is prompt enough. Waiting three months to start an investigation is too long.

So, do you now understand my answer to the oft-asked question? Yes, you should investigate an allegation of hostile work environment regardless of whether an EEO Complaint is pending. And you need to commence it as soon as you learn about the allegation. You can avoid agency liability! You can ensure you have a workplace free of harassment. And that’s all Good News! [email protected]

Check out FELTG’s upcoming training Conducting Effective Harassment Investigations, April 25-27, 2023, on Zoom.

Three Costly Lessons on Reasonable Accommodation

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By Deborah J. Hopkins, March 6, 2023

There are always two sides to a reasonable accommodation (RA) case: the agency’s side and the complainant’s side. While a lot of our training programs at FELTG focus on avoiding agency liability, there’s another aspect to this that’s important to mention, and that’s doing the right thing for the employee who requests accommodation. We see too many instances where an agency handles an RA request improperly, and it exacerbates the employee’s medical condition, causing further harm.

The goal should always be to process RA requests according to the law. One way to ensure that happens is to look at cases to see what agencies did correctly, and also cases where they could have handled requests better. Today I want to highlight three important lessons from fairly recent RA cases.

1. If an accommodation is working, don’t change it. Every now and then we see a scenario where an employee is on a long-term RA, and a new supervisor comes in and revokes the RA, thus causing problems for the complainant and the agency. Once such case involved a technical editor who suffered from irritable bowel syndrome. She was on 100 percent telework with a flexible schedule for several years. She had been performing her duties, preparing manuscripts and various administrative oversight functions, at an acceptable level throughout this time.

A new supervisor took over the department and cancelled all existing telework agreements, including the complainant’s. The complainant notified the supervisor she needed telework to accommodate her disability and she requested the RA be granted back to her. The agency refused and, among other things, claimed the complainant’s job was not telework eligible, despite the fact that she’d been performing the work from home for several years. As a result of the accommodation denial, the complainant stopped coming to work. The EEOC found that the agency failed to provide an RA. It ordered the agency to offer the complainant a retroactive reinstatement, with appropriate back pay and benefits, and to investigate the complainant’s claim for damages. Sandra A. v. Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 2021002132 (Sept. 16, 2021), request for recon. denied, EEOC Request No. 202200276 (Mar. 7, 2022).

2. Don’t skip the interactive process. In this case, the complainant was a food inspector who developed asthma. The chemical sprays used to wash animal carcasses in his work area exacerbated his condition, so he provided a medical note to inform his agency of the issue. Rather than consider the medical note as an RA request, the agency considered the note as evidence the complainant could not work in his designated area and sent him home. The EEOC found this particular conclusion to be rational at the time.

From home, the complainant again requested an RA – specifically, the use of a certain type of respirator his physician recommended that would filter out the workplace chemicals that irritated his respiratory system. The agency denied this request, claiming “there is no evidence that demonstrates significant inhalation exposure to the employees at the establishment.” The complainant continued to make requests. After a few weeks, the agency informed him that he could use a different type of respirator than the one his doctor had ordered. However, this respirator did not filter out the chemicals that caused the complainant respiratory distress, so he again requested to use the respirator the physician recommended. He was denied because, according to the agency, it “would be an undue burden because it is a safety hazard while performing his animal slaughter duties as well as concerns with complying with OSHA’s regulatory requirements.”

EEOC noted that by requesting use of the respirator, the complainant requested the interactive process: “This informal, interactive process should be a problem-solving approach that includes: an analysis of the job to determine its essential functions; consultations with the complainant; an assessment of the effectiveness of potential accommodations; and consideration of the complainant’s preferences. 29 C.F.R. pt.1630, app. § 1630.9.”

The EEOC held the agency failed to engage in the interactive process because it did not “participate in this necessary exchange of information, which resulted in the improper denial of a reasonable accommodation.” The EEOC ordered the agency to consider the complainant’s request for compensatory damages. Tyson A. v. USDA, EEOC Appeal No. 2020000972 (Aug. 16, 2021).

3. After receiving sufficient medical documentation, don’t ask for more. The complainant in this case was injured at work. As a result, she required surgery and reasonable accommodations. She provided sufficient medical documentation to substantiate her FMLA and RA requests, but the supervisor still contacted the complainant’s medical provider without the complainant’s permission to make further inquiries about the complainant’s medical restrictions.

The supervisor was unable to explain why she needed additional medical documentation, so the EEOC found the agency committed a per se violation of the Rehabilitation Act by conducting an unlawful disability-related inquiry. EEOC remanded the case for a back pay award and a compensatory damages assessment. Eleni M. v. Army, EEOC Appeal N. 2020001903 (Sept. 7, 2021), request for recon. denied, EEOC Request No. 2021005193 (Feb. 22, 2022).

We’ll be addressing these issues and more during EEOC Law Week next week, on June 14 in Reasonable Accommodation: Meeting Post-pandemic Challenges in Your Agency, and as part of the updated Reasonable Accommodation in the Federal Workplace in 2023 webinar series, beginning July 20. [email protected]

And Now a Word With … Michael Wolf of FLRA’s CADRO Program

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By Dan Gephart, February 21, 2023

Soon after the Administrative Dispute Resolution Action was amended in 1996, the Federal Labor Relations Authority established the Collaboration and Alternative Dispute Resolution (CADRO) program. CADRO provides mediation for negotiability petitions and arbitration exceptions pending before the Authority and offers training on building healthy workplace resolutions and resolving conflict.

The program developed a reputation (one well-backed by statistics) as a successful resource for resolving complex and sensitive cases. The goal, Director Michael Wolf said is “to improve mission performance, quality of work life, and labor-management engagement.”

This time two years ago, however, there was no CADRO. It was a victim of the previous administration’s strongly held positions on labor relations.

Then-FLRA Chairman Ernie DuBester reestablished the program in late February 2021 and brought Wolf back to the fold. That was followed several weeks later by the return of Merritt Weinstein to his former CADRO position as senior dispute resolution specialist. As Wolf says, he and Weinstein “are CADRO!”

Since CADRO was reestablished, parties requested or agreed to requests for assistance in 51 negotiability cases concerning 554 disputed proposals and disapproved provisions, according to Wolf. The parties resolved all but two of the 470 language disputes in cases that closed. They are currently working on 84 language disputes in nine other negotiability cases.

We caught up with a very busy Wolf to talk about the return of CADRO and its services and get his insight on how best to resolve workplace conflict and avoid grievances. We cover the former in today’s first of a two-part article. You can find Part II here.

DG: What has been the biggest shift or change you’ve seen in cases that come your way compared to the previous iteration of CADRO?

MW: The biggest change has been the volume of ULP [Unfair Labor Practice] cases in which we are conducting settlement conferences. To help expedite clearing a backlog of more than 450 ULP charges that the FLRA Office of General Counsel deemed meritorious and queued for issuing a complaint, the FLRA Chief Judge has ordered the parties in virtually every case to participate in a settlement conference before the case can be heard by an ALJ. [Editor’s note: Due to the absence of a GC at the Authority during the previous administration, the FLRA built up a backlog of ULP cases.]

Parties appear to have done a great job settling backlogged cases before they entered the Settlement Judge Program. By this summer, CADRO staff expect to conduct settlement conferences in the last of almost 300 backlogged ULP complaints that have entered the Settlement Judge Program, plus dozens more pre-complaint ULP cases.

DG: How long did it take to get the program up-and-running again at full speed?

MW: Merritt and I found ourselves running at top speed almost immediately. During our first 12 weeks back in CADRO, we were actively involved in 15 negotiability cases containing 147 language disputes. Parties successfully resolved 145 of those language disputes during our mediation process, as other unions and agencies submitted additional requests for CADRO assistance in negotiability cases.

We started sprinting at more than full speed when ULP complaints started to issue in mid-2021. Now that we are mediating arbitration exceptions again, we are not letting our foot off the gas. We try to resolve negotiability cases in eight to ten weeks. We try to resolve ULP complaints in about twelve weeks. Our settlement rate for negotiability cases since CADRO was restored is just over 90 percent. Our settlement rate for ULPs is about 85 percent.

DG: For those out there who have never used CADRO, why should they choose it?

MW: Workplace conflict is inevitable. If we manage conflict poorly, it is more likely to be costly and destructive. At CADRO, we utilize specialized knowledge, skills, and decades of experience helping representatives of management and unions prevent conflict from becoming destructive and, when it cannot be prevented, to manage and resolve it constructively. This can help improve mission performance, quality of work life, and labor-management engagement. Those are the three legs of a sustainable, labor-management relationship that is value-added rather than a cost of doing business.

DG: Describe CADRO’s approach to mediation?

MW: Our style of mediation is “situational” rather than facilitative or evaluative or some other label. Parties define success, which might not include settling the litigation pending before FLRA. We rely on problem-solving skills, listening skills, negotiation skills, organizational familiarity, and substantive familiarity to offer parties the best opportunity to satisfy their legitimate interests. We offer parties an opportunity to go beyond the legal questions that gave rise to their case, if both want to, and explore ways to resolve the underlying problems that triggered litigation in the first place. We strive to earn parties’ respect by being neutral, ethical, and patient yet persistent. We use an interest-based process that is collaborative, confidential, low-risk, relatively informal, and normally requires only one ground rule: treat each other with mutual respect.

Another important reason people choose to use CADRO is results. We have a track record of helping parties achieve what they identify as most important, and almost always far quicker than waiting for a litigated outcome.

[Editor’s note: Visit here to learn more about CADRO and its services. For more on settling disputes, join FELTG on April 12 for Drafting Enforceable and Legally Sufficient Settlement Agreements.] [email protected]

Masks and Tests: Here Come the COVID Discipline Cases

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By Deborah J. Hopkins, February 14, 2023

It took less than a year of a quorum at the MSPB before we got our first two cases involving agency discipline related to COVID-19 – consequently, both from the Air Force. In one case, the agency prevailed. In the other, the Board mitigated the appellant’s removal to a seven-day suspension. Let’s take a look.

Opposed to Wearing a Mask

The appellant was a GS-06 pharmacy technician whose job duties included filling and refilling prescriptions, entering orders into a medical database, checking medication stock, inspecting the pharmacy, and consulting with patients and physicians. In March 2020, the agency imposed a mask mandate for anyone entering the medical center, including employees. The agency stationed personnel at the building’s entry to enforce its mask policy, and to screen would-be entrants for fever. Once inside the facility, employees were permitted to remove their masks if they were able to keep physically distanced from other people.

In September 2020, the appellant was stopped twice at the entryway for not wearing a mask. The appellant subsequently informed agency officials she had “a sincerely held religious belief that precluded her from wearing a mask or other face covering.” In November 2020, the agency imposed a more stringent mask policy, which required individuals in the building to be masked at all times unless they were alone in a room and behind closed doors. The next day, the appellant was told that if she did not wear a face covering, she would not be able to enter the building and report for duty.

The appellant contacted the EEO office and “began to absent herself from work in order to avoid the mask requirement.” She exhausted her leave and remained absent from work for several weeks. In January 2021, the agency proposed her removal for (1) unauthorized absence and (2) failure to comply with established leave procedures. The removal was implemented in April 2021.

In her appeal of the removal, the appellant alleged affirmative defenses of religious discrimination and EEO reprisal. The AJ held – and the Board affirmed – the appellant did not prove her affirmative defenses: “[A]lthough the appellant’s religious beliefs, her refusal to wear a mask, and the absences underlying her removal are linked, a finding that the appellant was removed for either unauthorized absences or failure to follow masking policy does not entail a finding that the removal was motivated by the appellant’s religious beliefs.”

The case includes a discussion of the agency’s exhaustive efforts to consider a religious accommodation, and it’s worth a read if you have any role in processing (or defending against) religious accommodation requests. In the end the Board sustained the removal. Davis v. USAF, DA-0752-21-0227-I-1 (Feb. 2, 2023)(NP) [PDF].

Fabricating Wife’s COVID-19 Diagnosis

The appellant in this case was a WG-10 composite/plastic fabricator. On April 28, 2021, he reported to the agency his daughter was exhibiting symptoms of COVID-19. The next day, he reported his daughter had tested positive for COVID-19, so the agency ordered him to stay home for 14 days.

The day before he was scheduled to return to work, he reported that his wife had just tested positive for COVID-19. He was ordered to stay home an additional 14 days. He finally returned to work on May 27, and “later submitted to the agency photos of two COVID-19 home testing kits, appearing to have positive results, with his wife and daughter’s names written on the test cards.”

On June 10, the appellant’s friend called the agency and requested a day of LWOP for the appellant because he “ was incoherent due to medications he was taking.” The agency, concerned for the appellant, requested the police perform a wellness check.

The police found the appellant wasn’t home. After the wellness check, the appellant’s second-level supervisor called the appellant’s wife to inquire further. The appellant’s wife stated her daughter had an exposure to COVID-19 at school but that “[n]o other Covid incidents happened,” which contradicted the appellant’s version of April events.

Over the next several days, the appellant was absent from work multiple times. He provided a note from a chiropractor to cover the absences. His supervisor, suspicious about the authenticity of the notes, called the medical office to confirm. The supervisor learned the appellant had not seen the chiropractor on at least two dates for which he provided medical notes. Also, he was not given a note excusing him from work.

As a result, the agency proposed removal, with three charges: (1) lack of candor; (2) disregard of directive; and (3) unauthorized absence. The deciding official sustained all three charges. The appellant filed a Board appeal but did not request a hearing, so the AJ issued an initial decision based on the written record, sustaining charges 1 and 2 but not charge 3. The AJ also denied the affirmative defenses of disability discrimination under the theories of disparate treatment and failure to accommodate. The AJ upheld the removal.

On PFR, the Board scrutinized the credibility of the evidence and the witness testimony. The Board held the agency did not prove Lack of Candor because, among other things:

  • The statements about COVID-19 made by the appellant’s wife were recounted secondhand by agency officials.
  • When the appellant’s wife spoke to agency officials, she was angry about being asked for personal medical information.
  • While some of the appellant’s statements are not entirely consistent, “we find that as a whole, the agency has presented insufficient evidence to prove by preponderant evidence that the appellant’s statements regarding his wife and daughter testing positive for COVID-19 were untruthful.”
  • While the appellant has admitted he added an additional date to the medical note, he claimed his doctor authorized him to do so.
  • There was conflicting evidence within the chiropractor’s office about whether the appellant was seen on a particular date.

Because all three specifications failed, the agency did not prove Lack of Candor. The Board held the agency proved one specification of Disregard of Directive related to the appellant’s improper leave request procedures.

Because the agency failed to prove Charges 1 and 3 and only proved one specification of Charge 2, the Board found removal to be unreasonable and mitigated the penalty to a 7-day suspension.

The Board’s brief Douglas analysis relied on mitigating factors, including that “the appellant made contact with the agency to inform his supervisor that he would be absent, albeit not in the way in which he was instructed” and that “[the appellant] and his wife were having relationship troubles.” It gives insight into the Board’s reasoning, so it’s worth a look. Ortiz v. USAF, DE-0752-22-0062-I-1 (Jan. 25, 2023)(NP) [PDF].

While these cases are nonprecedential, they include a number of important takeaways and lessons about the current Board, which we’ll discuss in more detail next month during MSPB Law Week. Join us March 27-31 on Zoom and we’ll fill you in on everything you need to know. [email protected]

Is This a New Type of Tangible Employment Action?

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By Deborah J. Hopkins, February 14, 2023

When we discuss tangible employment actions in our EEO classes, we usually focus on facts in existing case law: a supervisor takes a pay-related action (such as a suspension, or non-selections) against an employee because of the employee’s response to the supervisor’s unwelcome sexual advances.

The Supreme Court has ruled that a tangible employment action constitutes “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).

A fairly new case from EEOC has seemingly broadened the type of action considered a “tangible employment action” in Federal agencies and has also included actions motivated not by an employee’s responses to sexual overtures but by a supervisor’s distaste for a complainant because of the complainant’s sexual orientation. In this case, the complainant accused his supervisor of creating a hostile work environment based on sex, citing several examples over a span of four years. The complainant claimed his supervisor:

  • Made negative comments about the complainant’s sexual orientation in a chat message with a coworker.
  • Was condescending to the complainant in emails.
  • Verbally attacked the complainant about his breaks and lunch periods.
  • Informed the complainant that he could only use certain doors when arriving to and leaving the workplace, making the door closest to the supervisor’s workstation off-limits.
  • Told the complainant that he was no longer allowed to “loiter” in the parking lot after work hours.
  • Required the complainant to inform her when he was coming and going from the workplace, despite a maxi-flex schedule.
  • Excluded the complainant from office discussions in an effort to get him to resign.

The agency asserted it was not liable because it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the harassing behavior when:

  • It followed its internal workplace harassment policy once the complainant made a claim of harassment.
  • It allowed the complainant to maximize telework in order to avoid the supervisor while the agency worked to resolve the situation.
  • It eventually transferred the supervisor to a lower-graded position within the agency.

In its FAD, the agency found the supervisor created a hostile work environment but argued there was no agency liability because the “[s]upervisor’s actions did not result in a tangible employment action.”

On appeal, EEOC disagreed and found the agency was liable:

Despite this approved [maxi-flex] work schedule, Supervisor made it clear to Complainant that he was only allowed strict break and lunch times. Additionally, despite his maxi-flex schedule, Complainant was informed that he was to notify Supervisor any time that he was leaving his workspace. Lastly, Supervisor acknowledged that she informed Complainant that he was only allowed to use certain doors for exiting and entering. We find these actions constitute tangible employment actions as they altered the terms and conditions of Complainant’s employment. [bold added]

Nathanial P. v. NPS, EEOC Appeal No. 2021000613 (Jan. 13, 2022).

We discuss the ever-changing world of hostile work environment harassment as part of our comprehensive EEOC Law Week, next held March 13-17. Join us for the day or the week; we’ll be happy to have you there. [email protected]

Do the FELTG Check-in and Ensure Accommodation is Still Effective

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By Dan Gephart, February 14, 2023

It was a reasonable accommodation success.

Until it wasn’t.

The accommodation process is a fluid one. You can’t provide an accommodation and then forget about it. This is particularly important now, as many employees with reasonable accommodations make their way back to the physical workplace.

Kristopher M. v. Department of Transportation, App. No. 2019001911 (EEOC 2020) provides a perfect lesson on the importance of continuous communication with employees AFTER they receive accommodations, something that we at FELTG have coined the “Check-in.”

[Editor’s note: For more on this topic, register for Revisiting Existing Reasonable Accommodations, a 60-minute webinar on April 13.]

Upon his hiring in 2005, an IRS agent requested and received a BAT keyboard as a reasonable accommodation. The agent had paralysis in his left hand and the keyboard allowed him to enter data with his right hand.

So far, so good, right?

Fast-forward seven years. The employee’s typing workload increased, causing serious strain, fatigue, and a tingly pain in his right hand. The BAT keyboard was no longer an effective accommodation. The agent requested Dragon software in 2012, and the agency approved it. The software was installed on the employee’s computer, and he was provided training.

So far, so good, right?

Unfortunately, the Dragon software did not work well with the agent’s computer. His computer screen would freeze. Applications would just shut down. He was unable to simultaneously use the Dragon software with the other software programs required for his job (Word, Excel, etc.).

It is here, FELTG Nation, where the process broke down.

The agent struggled with the software and let the agency know. Per the EEOC decision, it appears that there was a back-and-forth between the reasonable accommodation staff and IT about who had the responsibility to address the employee’s computer issues. Meanwhile, the employee went back to using the BAT keyboard. He developed carpal tunnel syndrome in his right hand and pain in his right arm and neck.

Even though it had twice listened to the employee and gave the employee his requested accommodation, the agency still failed to provide the employee with an effective accommodation, per the EEOC AJ.

On appeal, the commission determined the agency’s efforts to deal with the Dragon software/computer issues were either unduly delayed or only partially implemented. The Dragon software was not an effective accommodation, the EEOC ruled. It ordered the agency to engage in a rigorous interactive process with the employee for a 60-day period to come up with effective accommodations.

Wouldn’t you rather just do the FELTG Check-in with employee, see how the accommodation is working and make the adjustments, when necessary, rather than be ordered by the EEOC to conduct a specified period of the interactive process?

The FELTG Check-in is free and ensures that your employee has all the tools he/she/they need to do the job’s essential functions and help the agency meet its mission. Skipping the FELTG Check-in could be damaging to productivity, morale, and the agency’s bottom line. Beyond the required interactive process, the agency in the Kristopher case was required to:

  • Pay the agent $75,000 in compensatory damages within 60 days.
  • Pay the agent $68,761.69 in attorney’s fees and costs ordered by the AJ within 60 days.
  • Provide the supervisors and coordinators involved to take at least eight hours of reasonable accommodation training.

Remember: Your agency’s obligation to provide an effective accommodation does not end when you provide an accommodation. You must ensure the accommodation is actually effective. [email protected]

The Good News: Two FLRA Members Can Still Issue Decisions

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By Ann Boehm, February 14, 2023

On Jan. 3, 2023, FLRA Chairman Ernest DuBester’s term ended. This means the FLRA currently has only two members: now-Chairman Susan Tsui Grundmann, Democrat, and Member Colleen Duffy Kiko, Republican. With two members, the FLRA has a quorum that can continue to issue decisions. But will that happen with two members from different political parties? Several things indicate the answer to that question is, “yes.”

Let’s start by looking at what has happened since Jan. 3, 2023. The FLRA has issued six decisions since that date. That indicates that these two members, from different political parties, can indeed agree and issue decisions.

There is also historical information that suggests the FLRA will continue to issue decisions, even with two members from different political parties. From May 2000 to November 2000, Democrat Don Wasserman and Republican Dale Cabaniss were the FLRA’s members. They issued 100 decisions during that time. That means they agreed 100 times.

From August 1995 to February 1996, Democrat Phyllis Segal and Republican Tony Armendariz were the FLRA’s members. They issued 67 decisions during that time. That means they agreed 67 times.

Weird, isn’t it? People from different political parties can actually agree on something.

The FLRA has been around since 1978. Throughout its existence, we have seen that Republican members can be a little more pro-agency, and Democratic members can be a little more pro-union. But there are limitations on how those tendencies impact on FLRA member decisions.

For one thing, the FLRA members are charged with interpreting the very detailed Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. It says what it says.

In addition, the FLRA members have guidance from 44 years of FLRA case law interpreting that same statute. There are also 40-plus years of decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. Supreme Court interpreting that statute.

So, what does this all mean? Chairman Grundmann and Member Kiko are likely to issue a lot of decisions while they serve together. If they disagree, there is no quorum, and no decision will issue. History suggests we will not see that occur often. And that’s Good News. [email protected]